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Of Money and Judicial
Independence: Can Inherent Powers Protect
State Courts in Tough Fiscal Times?
BY MICHAEL L. BUENGER*
The complete independence of the courts ofjustice is peculiarly essential
in a limited constitution. . . . Without this, all the reservations of
particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.'
We are looking at the dismantling of our court system; it is a very painful
process. 2
We're talking about things that are simply horrendous.
3
INTRODUCTION
I t is described as "the worst budget crisis among the states since
World War II."' State officials across the country have likened it to
B.A. (cum laude) 1983, University of Dayton; J.D. (cum laude) 1989, St.
Louis University. State Courts Administrator, Supreme Court of Missouri.
President, Conference of State Court Administrators (2003-2004).
'THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey &
James McClellan eds., 2001).
2 David L. Hudson, Jr., Cutting Costs ... and Courts: Judicial Resources
Dwindle as States Cope with Budget Crisis, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2003, at 17 (quoting
Kateri Walsh, Community Relations Administrator, Oregon State Bar).
3 Nancy McCarthy, State Budget Woes Hit Courts Hard, CAL. B.J., Apr. 2003,
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar-cbj.jsp?sCategoryPath=/Home/
Attomey%/o20Resources/Califomia%20Bar/o2OJoumal/April2003&sCatHtmlPat
h=cbj/04 TH 2 Court-woes.html&sCatHtmliTitle=Top%2OHeadlines (quoting
Los Angeles Appellate Justice Norman Epstein).
' See Jason White, Govs Scramble for Soundbites to Decry Budget Crisis,
STATELINE.ORG, Mar. 21, 2003, at http://www.stateline.org/stateline.org/?pa=
story&sa=vshowstoryinfo&id=295396 (quoting Idaho Governor Dirk
Kempthome). Other state officials have described the looming budget crisis as the
worst since the Great Depression. See Hudson, supra note 2, at 16. Governor Paul
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a "Perfect Storm," "the Incredible Hulk of budget deficits," and a "problem
of historic proportions."5 Some estimates place the combined operating
shortfalls of the states in fiscal year 2004 at over $68.5 billion, while others
predict the more accurate figure is closer to $100 billion.6 California alone
faced a projected $38 billion deficit, partly contributing to the recall of its
Governor.' Almost every state in the nation is reporting a long-term,
deepening fiscal crisis that jeopardizes funding of critical services and
renders many previously hallowed programs subject to draconian cuts, if
not outright elimination The states' courts have not gone untouched. 9
From Maine to California, from Florida to Alaska, the mushrooming
fiscal crisis is impacting state court systems by forcing them to compete for
funding against more politically popular services such as education, health
care, and public safety, often with only marginal success.'" As a result,
Patton of Kentucky observed, "Our present fiscal crisis calls into question our
continued ability to execute our existing public policy, because, to be very plain
about it, we don't have enough money." White, supra.
See White, supra note 4.
6 The National Conference of State Legislatures projects the $68.5 billion
figure. State Budget Gaps Growing at Alarming Rate According to New NCSL
National Fiscal Report, NCSL NEWS (Nat'l Conf. of State Legislatures, Denver,
Colo.) (Feb. 4, 2003), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2003/pr030204.htm.
The Center for Budget and Policy Priorities projects the $100 billion estimate.
Nicholas Johnson et al., States are Making Deep Budget Cuts in Response to the
Fiscal Crisis, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, at http://www.cbpp.org/3-19-
03sfp.htm (Mar. 20, 2003); see also Council of State Gov'ts, Emerging Issues
Summary, March 2003, http://www.csg.org/CSG/Policy/Fiscal/archives.htm.
' Howard Fineman & Karen Breslau, California: State of Siege, NEWSWEEK,
July 28, 2003, at 28 (discussing the recall of California's former governor Gray
Davis).
See id.
9 See William McCall, Courts Across Nation Face Deep Budget Cuts, SEATTLE
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2003, at A4; Lisa Stansky, The Big Squeeze, NAT'L L.J., May 23,
2003, at 1, col. 1; Seth Stem, States Reconsider Drastic Court Cutbacks,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 29, 2003, at 2.
0 This is not the first time a funding crisis has adversely impacted the courts.
See Employees & Judge of the Second Judicial Dist. Court v. County of Hillsdale,
378 N.W.2d 744, 745 (Mich. 1985).
The governmental funding crisis that is the backdrop for these conflicts
began in this state in the late 1960's and early 1970's. An explosion of
litigation, the creation of new courts, new judicial remedies, inflation, the
introduction of unionization into the public sector, substantial unemploy-
ment, and public resistance to tax increases created increased competition
between the courts and units of local government for local tax revenues.
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courts are curtailing operating hours, laying off employees, and terminating
what were once thought to be inviolate, even sacrosanct programs. In
Oregon, one of the states most seriously hit, the courts closed one day per
week, furloughed employees, and implemented a "delay and no action"
policy on processing certain types of cases. California faced cutting
almost $200 million from its judiciary budget, forcing early retirements,
reducing full-time jobs to three-quarter time, limiting night court, and
closing courtrooms. 2 Missouri faced a possible fifteen percent across-the-
board reduction that would have closed courthouses and eliminated as
many as one in four nonstatutory employees. 3 Florida's Chief Justice
spoke of drastic cuts in court personnel and operations, and called upon the
state bar to lobby the legislature for adequate funding of the judiciary. 4
Considering that some ninety-five percent of the nation's litigation takes
place in state courts, 5 the current fiscal crisis gives rise to significant
Id.
" See Chief Justice William P. Carson, Jr., A Message from the Chief Justice
of the Oregon Supreme Court, http://www.osbar.org/0bamews/monthly02/bracl.
htm (Nov. 25, 2002). The Oregon Supreme Court, in response to drastic budget
cuts, closed all appellate, tax, and circuit courts on Fridays from March I to June
30, 2003, and also cut staff hours by ten percent. In addition, many courts stopped
hearing a wide range of cases, including small claims and non-person
misdemeanors. Id.
12 See McCarthy, supra note 3.
"3 Josh Flory, Budget Cuts Could Delay Court Cases, COLUM. DAILY TRIB.,
Apr. 22, 2003, http://archive.columbiatribune.com/2003/apr/20030422news002
.asp.
14 See James L. Rosica, Florida Not Alone in Funding Woes, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT, Apr. 30, 2003, at B1; see also ABA, State Court Funding Crisis:
Summary of Issues and ABA Policies, http://www.abanet.org/
jdlcourtfunding/issues.html (last visited May 11, 2004).
In Alabama, jury trials were temporarily suspended in 2002 due to lack of
funds, although emergency funds were made available to resume
trials.... In Kansas, budget cuts forced the Supreme Court to take the
unusual step under its inherent authority of imposing a $5 emergency
surcharge on all case filings .... In Massachusetts, the judicial branch
experienced a $40 million deficit in 2002, with additional cuts anticipated
in 2003. The courts have lost over 1,000 employees through attrition and
layoffs.
Id.
"5 According to the National Courts Statistics Project, in calendar year 2001
2,624,917 cases were filed in the federal courts compared to 92,830,355 cases filed
in the state courts. BRIAN S. OSTROM ET AL., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS, 2002: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURTS STATISTIC PROJECT
2003-2004]
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constitutional, political, and policy questions, not to mention the impact it
has on the judicial process and the people it serves. 6 The crisis also
reinforces Alexander Hamilton's observation that the judiciary is arguably
the weakest of the branches, if a true branch of government at all. 7
13 (2003). Based on these statistics, state courts filings account for ninety-nine%
of all cases filed in the courts of the United States. The almost ninety-three million
cases filed in state courts in 2001 were processed through 15,555 individual state
trial courts. Id. at 11.
6 In general, state court funding accounts for only about two0/o-four0/o of
general fund expenditures in any state. In some states, the amount is even less. For
example, in FY 2004 Missouri spent only 1.65% of its general fund on judicial
operations, 90% of which were personnel expenses. Nevertheless, the amount spent
nationwide is significant. State court expenses are estimated to be $12-$15 billion
annually, not including important "justice related" expenditures such as indigent
defense, an item that is usually absorbed by some other non-judiciary budget line
item. See Frances Kahn Zemans, Court Funding, ABA Standing Comm. on
Judicial Independence (Apr. 2003), http://www.abanet.org/jd/courtfunding/
courtfunding.pdf.
"7 In defending the creation of a separate federal judicial department Hamilton
argued:
[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least
dangerous to the political rights of the constitution; because it will be least
in a capacity to annoy or injure them.... It proves incontestibly that the
judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of
power; that it can never attack with success either of the other two; and that
all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks.
It equally proves, that though individual oppression may now and then
proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can
never be endangered from that quarter: I mean, so long as the judiciary
remains truly distinct from both the legislative and the executive.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (footnote
omitted). Under Missouri's budget laws, the state supreme court and its division
are classified as "departments" for purposes of preparing and submitting a budget.
See Mo. REV. STAT. § 476.265(l)-(2) (2003).
(1) The budget for the funding of the judicial department by the state for
each fiscal year shall be formulated in the same manner as provided.., in
section 33.220, RSMo, except as otherwise provided in this section.
(2) For purposes of budget procedures, the supreme court shall be
considered as the head of the department. The chief judge of each district
of the court of appeals with the approval of a majority of the judges of each
district and the presiding judge of each circuit with the approval of a
majority of the circuit and associate circuit judges of the circuit shall
present their estimates for the districts and circuits, respectively, in the same
manner as a division of a department of the executive branch of govern-
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There is nothing like a funding crisis to raise the specter of a
constitutional battle among the branches of government. In such instances,
the executive and legislative branches, armed with their vast array of
budgetary authority, face the judiciary, equipped solely with its status as a
branch of government and its inherent right to exist at a meaningful level. 8
The current crisis brings to the surface simmering disputes and
philosophical differences that have roots as old as the Republic--disputes
that center on money, but reveal once again the ever present tension
implicit in the design of American government." The
ment.
Id. For an outline of the procedures state budget director and executive departments
are to follow in preparation of the annual state budget, see id. § 33.220.
'8 Alexander Hamilton once observed:
[T]he judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or
the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society;
and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have
neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend
upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton).
"9 Notwithstanding his initial concern for preserving judicial independence,
Thomas Jefferson became a voracious critic of the national judiciary, particularly
in the aftermath of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Jefferson
viewed the Marbury decision as a usurpation of separate powers, which would lead
to despotic rule by judges. Jefferson maintained this position long after the
decision. In 1815, he wrote to W.H. Torrance:
The... question, whether the judges are invested with exclusive authority
to decide on the constitutionality of a law, has been heretofore a subject of
consideration with me in the exercise of official duties. Certainly there is
not a word in the constitution which has given that power to them more than
to the executive legislative branches.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to W.H. Torrance (June 11, 1815),
http://memory.loc. gov/cgi-bin/query/r? ammem/mtj: @ field
(DOCID+@lit(tj110157)). Jefferson later wrote: "My construction of the
constitution is... that each department is truly independent of the others, and has
an equal right to decide for itself what is the meaning of the constitution in the
cases submitted to its action... ." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane
(Sept. 6, 1819), http://wyllie.lib.virginia.edu:8086/perl/toccer-
new?id=JefLett.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=Hexts/english/modeng/par
sed&tag=public&part=255&division-div. His suspicion of and criticism for the
judiciary never waned, as evidenced by his 1825 letter to Edward Livingston in
which he wrote:
This member of the Government [the judiciary] was at first considered as
2003-2004]
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crisis also raises pressing questions concerning the value of a separate
judiciary, the evolving notions of judicial independence, and the meaning
and application of the courts' inherent powers.20 What does it mean to have
a separate, independent, and coequal judiciary when that status depends
upon a broad range of funding decisions defined by the priorities, politics,
and power of the Legislature?21 Can history inform and define the breadth
the most harmless and helpless of its organs. But has proved that the power
of declaring what the law is, ab libitum, by sapping and mining, slyly, and
without alarm, the foundations of the Constitution, can do what open force
would not dare to attempt.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Mar. 25, 1825),
http://www.constitution.org/tj/jeffl6.txt; see also Paul D. Carrington, Judicial
Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 tbl. 14 (1998). Jefferson's distrust of the national judiciary
may have been as much politics as philosophy. Many of the members of the
national judiciary during Jefferson's presidency were federalists whose views on
the breadth and limits of the Constitution differed markedly from his own views.
Id.
20 It would not be the first time that state courts have resorted to this largely
self-defined concept. See infra notes 69-75. In In re Salary of the Juvenile
Director, 552 P.2d 163 (Wash. 1976), the Washington Supreme Court engaged in
a long, in-depth analysis of the practical, legal, and political consequences of using
inherent power to compel funding authorities (in that case a county commission
board) to spend money. The court concluded:
Hence, it is incumbent upon courts, when they must use their inherent
power to compel funding, to do so in a manner which clearly communicates
and demonstrates to the public the grounds for the court's action. This can
be accomplished by imposing on the judiciary the highest burden of proof
in civil cases when courts seek to exercise their inherent power in the
context of court finance.
Id. at 174-75; accord Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Nineteenth Judicial Dist., 895
P.2d 545, 548 (Colo. 1995) (citing Kort v. Hufnagel, 729 P.2d 370, 373 (Colo.
1986)).
A court's inherent authority is generally limited to matters that are
reasonably necessary for the proper functioning of the judiciary.... [W]hile
the separation of powers doctrine prevents another branch of government
from encroaching upon the judiciary, the same principle bars a court from
intruding into the affairs of the legislative or executive branches.
Id.
21 Funding courts through the use of inherent power presents unique legal,
political, and logistical problems to the courts. As one commentator observed,
"[Cases involving] control over courthouse personnel, court budgets and court
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and limits of judicial independence, as well as the inherent powers courts
claim they need to enforce their actions and to protect themselves against
impermissible intrusion by the other branches? In light of funding disputes,
does the development of courts over the last half-century necessitate a
different attitude towards judicial independence and inherent authority?
How sweeping is the judiciary's right to compel funding when balanced
against the conterminous rights and obligations of the legislative and
executive branches to determine funding priorities? What price might state
judiciaries have to pay in exercising their inherent powers to compel
funding? This Article explores the answers to these questions.
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:
THE HISTORICAL ROOTS
Modern notions of judicial independence have important historical
roots that serve to elucidate traditional ideas regarding the breadth and
limits of the inherent powers of courts in America. This history also serves
to moderate contemporary romantic notions of the early Founders who, far
from being of one mind, faced monumental political and philosophical
differences in constructing a new government,22 especially with regard to
facilities ... [present] courts with special problems in defining limits to their
authority consistent with the prerogatives of other branches and with thejudiciary's
obligation to render impartial decisions." Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence,
Adequate Court Funding, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 MD. L. REV. 217,
221-22 (1993) (footnotes omitted). The problems are only amplified when the
dispute moves out of local courts to encompass the funding for an entire state
judicial system.
22 For example, Alexander Hamilton (arguably a closet monarchist) during the
Constitutional Convention advocated a limited monarchy, asserting, "[A]n
executive is less dangerous to the liberties of the people when in office during life,
than for seven years. It may be said this constitutes an elective monarchy!" NOTES
OF THE SECRET DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, TAKEN BY THE
LATE HON. ROBERT YATES, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AND ONE
OF THE DELEGATES FROM THAT STATE TO THE SAID CONVENTION (June 19, 1787),
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/yates.htm. Hamilton also proposed that
the national legislature appoint courts in each state "so as to make the State
governments unnecessary to it." He confessed, "[T]he people are gradually
ripening in their opinions of government-they begin to be tired of an excess of
democracy-and what even is the Virginia plan, but pork still, with a little change
2003-20041
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the function and structure of the judiciary.23 At the heart of this new
government was the diffusion of power expressed in the separation of
powers doctrine, a doctrine whose purpose was to limit the power of
government, especially the power of factions within the government.
The constitutional diffusion of government power was novel to the
eighteenth century, and no more so than with regard to the creation of the
American judicial model. Arguably the Founders' greatest and most
innovative political invention was not the diffusion of power across
branches of government (a concept largely accepted for years and
evidenced in the relationship between European monarchs and national
assemblies such as Parliament), but the creation of a separate judicial
"department" that would over time come to play an active, independent,
and integral role in governing the nation-a role beyond simply resolving
its disputes. 4 Over the years the American judiciary has come to enjoy
of the sauce." See id.
23 Arguably, it was not until the Supreme Court's decision in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that the "governing" role of courts was
ultimately clarified and established. Prior to this decision, Supreme Court decisions
applied to the parties and had little practical effect beyond the litigants; they were
not statements of public policy. Even as late as 1861 the power of courts to
participate in fashioning public policy through judicial review was questioned. In
his first inaugural address in 1861, Abraham Lincoln questioned the principle of
judicial review, opining that while court decisions clearly applied to the parties in
a case, they did not extend to establishing national policy applicable to everyone.
At the same time, the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the
Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are
made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions the people
will cease to be their own rulers ... [having] practically resigned their
Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.
FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/inaug/lincolnl.htm (Mar. 14, 1861).
21 One author has argued that judicial review-which would only be possible
with the creation of an independent judiciary--is "American constitutionalism's
greatest gift to the world-an arguably greater gift than the U.S. constitutional
model itself." Michael J. Glennon, The Case that Made the Court, WILSON Q.,
Summer 2003, at 20. James F. Simon, more pointed on the importance of Marbury
v. Madison in establishing judicial independence, observes:
But although Marshall had satisfied the Republicans' short-term
interests by rejecting Marbury's claim, he had purchased an enormous piece
of constitutional real estate for the Court. Marbury v. Madison established
the Court's authority to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional, a power
that would prove to be of historic significance in securing the institution's
[VOL. 92
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broader independence than perhaps any other judiciary in the history of the
world. As Donald L. Horowitz observed:
The difference in the scope of judicial power in England and the
United States should not be exaggerated. It is primarily a difference of
emphasis. There have been periods... of great passivity in America. But
still the difference remains. What it has meant, in the main, is that
American courts have been more open to new challenges, more willing to
take on new tasks. This has encouraged others to push problems their
way-so much so that no courts anywhere have greater responsibilityfor
making public policy than the courts of the United States.25
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that a truly separate and
actively independent judiciary was always part of the Founders' design.26
parity with Congress. Marshall's opinion also served notice that the Court,
not the president, would be the ultimate judge of claims of executive
privilege, an authority of seismic proportions.
JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL,
AND THE Epic STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES 187 (2002).
The importance of an independent judiciary cannot be overstated, and it has
produced great strides in civil rights, checked the arbitrary actions of the coordinate
branches, and acted as an effective bulwark against tyrannical majority rule. Its
great contribution to America's economic power is of equal importance. In many
emerging nations, the lack of both an independent judiciary and a reliable
commercial code is seen as a source of economic stagnation. See Daniel A. Farber,
Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 98 (2002) (arguing that protection of
human rights through constitutionalism and an independent judiciary is a signal to
investors of a nation's commitment to and capacity for economic liberalization);
see also Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of
Law: Administrative Law Reform and Rule of Law in the People's Republic of
China, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'LL. 161 (2001).
Even within the United States today, the lack of independent tribal courts is
seen as an impediment to economic development on many Indian reservations. See
Richard J. Ansson, Jr. & Ladine Oravetz, Tribal Economic Development: What
Challenges Lie Aheadfor Tribal Nations as They Continue to Strive for Economic
Diversity?, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 441 (2002).
2 5 DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 3 (1977) (emphasis
added).
26 See, e.g., THE PLAN OF CHARLES PINCKNEY (SOUTH CAROLINA), PRESENTED
TO THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, May 29, 1787,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/pinckney.htm [hereinafter PLAN OF
CHARLES PINCKNEY]. Under Pinckney's plan the Senate and House Delegates
2003-2004]
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Early American history does not manifestly support contemporary notions
of judicial independence, particularly in a modem institutional sense. The
earliest "judiciaries," institutionally speaking, were remarkably
indistinguishable from other departments of government,27 and arguably
retained very limited powers.2' Thus, while clearly revolutionary at the
would have the exclusive power to establish a federal judicial court and appoint
judges during good behavior. Additionally, they would retain the authority to
establish a court of admiralty in each state and to appoint the judges thereof. Id.
Even Chief Justice John Marshall, operating more out of concern for informed
politics than for any adamant principle, was not entirely committed to the complete
independence of the courts. Concerned that the impeachment of then Justice
Samuel Chase would negatively effect the independence of the newly created
federal judiciary, Marshall suggested that controversial judicial rulings should be
appealed to the legislature. Marshall wrote to Chase:
I think the modem doctrine of impeachment should yield to an appellate
jurisdiction in the legislature. A reversal of those legal opinions deemed
unsound by the legislature would certainly better comport with the mildness
of our character than a removal of the judge who has rendered them
unknowing his fault.
Letter from John Marshall to Samuel Chase (Jan. 23, 1804), reprinted in 3 ALBERT
J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 177 (1919).
27 See, e.g., FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT, OR ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION OF THE
COLONY OF NEW HAVEN, QUERY V (1639),
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/ctO1.htm.
Namely, that church members only shall be free burgesses, and that they
only shall choose magistrates and officers among themselves, to have power
of transacting all the public civil affairs of this plantation; of making and
repealing laws, dividing of inheritances, deciding of differences that may
arise, and doing all things and businesses of like nature.
Id; see also FUNDAMENTAL ORDERS OF 1639, ORDER 10,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/order.htm.
In which said General Courts shall consist the supreme power of the
Commonwealth, and they only shall have power to make laws or repeal
them.., and also shall have power to call either Court or Magistrate or any
other person whatsoever into question for any misdemeanor, and may for
just causes displace or deal otherwise according to the nature of the offense;
and also may deal in any other matter that concerns the good of this
Commonwealth, except election of Magistrates, which shall be done by the
whole body of Freemen.
28 See, e.g, THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF WEST NEW JERSEY,
AGREED UPON--1676, Chapter XIX,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/nj05.htm:
That there shall be in every court, three justices or commissioners, who
shall sit with the twelve men of the neighborhood, with them to hear all
[VOL. 92
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time, the creation of a truly separate judiciary was the product of
evolutionary thinking, informed by the philosophy of the Enlightenment 29
and by hard-fought struggles over the structure of the new government.30
Not everyone agreed with the idea of creating a truly separate judiciary.
The debate on the appropriate level of independence continues today.3 The
causes, and to assist the said twelve men... in case of law; and that they
the said justices shall pronounce such judgment as they shall receive from,
and be directed by the said twelve men in whom only the judgment resides,
and not otherwise.
Id.; see also A DECLARATION OF THE TRUE INTENT AND MEANING OF US THE LORDS
PROPRIETORS, AND EXPLANATION OF THERE CONCESSIONS MADE TO THE
ADVENTURERS AND PLANTERS OF NEW CAESAREA OR NEW JERSEY-1672,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/nj03.htrn.
[T]hat it is the power of the Governor and his Council to constitute and
appoint courts in particular corporations already settled, without the General
Assembly; but for the courts of sessions and assizes to be constituted and
established by the Governor Council and representatives together: and that
all appeals, shall be made from the assizes, to the Governor and his Council,
and thence to the Lords proprietors; from whom they may appeal to the
king....
Id.
29 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48 (James Madison).
30 For an excellent historical discussion on the tribulations of the early years of
the republic, see SIMON, supra note 24.
"' Even today, the breadth and limits ofjudicial independence are hotly debated
topics. See Mark Hamblett, Federal Judges Attack Sentencing Restrictions, N.Y.
L.J., Sept. 24, 2003, at 1. The Judicial Conference of the United States voted to
repeal key provisions of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the
Exploitation of Children Today ("PROTECT"') Act of 2003, arguing the new law
severely limits a trial judge's ability to depart from Sentencing Guidelines and
requires reports to Congress on any federal judge who does so. Id.; see also
Editorial, Dispensing Justice, WINSTON-SALEM J., Aug. 24,2003, at 16 (criticizing
Attorney General John Ashcroft's directive to U.S. Attorneys to collect data on
federal judges who issue sentences that are lighter than federal guidelines suggest).
This editorial argues that any attempt to compel judges to view cases "the same
way prosecutors do implies an inadequate regard for the public trust in the
impartiality and independence of the justice system" and "runs afoul ... of the
constitutional principle of separation of powers." Id.
See also Chief Justice Addresses Sentencing Issues, THE THIRD BRANCH
(Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C.), May 2003,
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/may03ttb/sentencing.htrnl. Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted:
Congress establishes the rules to be applied in sentencing; that is a
2003-2004]
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division between the exercise ofjudicial power by independent courts and
the authority of the coordinate branches has never been entirely certain.
Rather, the division has been a function of ebb and flow, depending on the
cultural and political environment of the age in which the exercise of such
power took place.
Generally speaking, two experiences framed the early debate over the
status ofjudicial power in America: the lack ofjudicial independence from
the Crown during colonial rule, and the lack ofjudicial independence from
state legislatures in the very early days of the Republic. Courts in colonial
America were not independent of the overarching authority of the monarch.
Like so many organs of European colonial government, they existed as
instruments for enforcing the policies of the home government.32 Colonial
courts-as distinguished from courts in the "Home Country"--existed at
the pleasure of the Crown as instruments of government power. These
courts substantiated not only the "laws" of the British Empire but also,
more importantly, the stated and unstated policies and prejudices of the
monarch and Parliament, unfettered by "constitutional" restraints.33
legislative function .... Judges apply those rules to individual cases; that
is a judicial function. There can be no doubt that collecting information
about how the sentencing guidelines, including downward departures, are
applied in practice could aid Congress in making decisions about whether
to legislate on these issues. There can also be no doubt that the subject
matter of the questions, and whether they target the judicial decisions of
individual federal judges, could amount to an unwarranted and ill-consid-
ered effort to intimidate individual judges in the performance of their
judicial duties. We must hope that these inquiries are designed to obtain
information in aid of the congressional legislative function, and will not
trench upon judicial independence.
Id. (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist).
32 Management of North American colonial affairs was generally lodged in the
Board of Trade, a London-based administrative body with authority to review and
disapprove all legislation passed by the colonial assemblies. See David S. Bogen,
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV (The Individual Liberties
Within the Body of the Constitution: A Symposium), 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 794,
805 n.34 (1987); James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition:
Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the
Government, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 899, 929 n.105 (1997); Robert E. Riggs,
Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIs. L. REV. 941, 967 (1990).
33 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 250-51 (James Madison) (George W.
Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001):
On the slightest view of the British constitution, we must perceive, that the
legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally
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Great Britain expressed home control over colonial judges that can be
described as schizophrenic; at the same time, the British, with an evolving
notion of judicial independence, sought to promote the judiciary's
independence from elected colonial authorities, though certainly not at the
expense of home control over the activities of judges and courts. 34 As early
as 1699, authorities in Great Britain expressed concern that colonial
legislatures' refusal to provide adequate pay for judges undermined the
administration and quality of justice.35 As colonial judges became more
independent, however, the pendulum swung and the Crown sought to
exercise greater control. In 1761, for example, the Privy Council issued
strict instructions to colonial governors prohibiting them from approving
any legislative act that conditioned judicial appointments on anything other
separate and distinct from each other. The executive magistrate forms an
integral part of the legislative authority. He alone has the prerogative of
making treaties with foreign sovereigns, which when made, have, under
certain limitations, the force of legislative acts. All the members of the
judiciary department are appointed by him, can be removed by him on the
address of the two houses of Parliament, and form, when he pleases to
consult them, one of his constitutional councils. One branch of the
legislative department, forms also a great constitutional council to the
executive chief; as, on another hand, it is the sole depository of judicial
power in cases of impeachment, and is invested with the supreme appellate
jurisdiction in all other cases. The judges again are so far connected with
the legislative department, as often to attend and participate in its delibera-
tions, though not admitted to a legislative vote.
From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly be
inferred, that in saying, "there can be no liberty where the legislative and
executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates;" or,
"if the power ofjudging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers he did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial
agency in, or no control over the acts of each other."
Id.
" Although the primary method for controlling colonial judges was regulation
of appointment, tenure, and salary, the British also maintained control over the
colonial legal process by providing a final appeal to the Privy Council in London.
This method remains in effect today in several countries that are part of the United
Kingdom. For example, the Green Party of New Zealand seeks to supplant appeals
to the Privy Council with a truly independent Supreme Court that would have final
say on all legal matters in that nation. Editorial, On to the Republic, OTAGO DAILY
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2003, 2003 WL 63438515.




than pleasure.36 Thus, judicial independence for colonial courts was
conditional, resting upon the good graces of the Crown, Parliament, and
appointed colonial agents.37
The principal method used to restrain the independent behavior of
colonial judges was through control of their appointments, tenures, and
salaries.38 Unlike judges in England, who enjoyed tenure during good
behavior under the 1702 Act of Settlement, colonial judges generally
served at the pleasure of the Crown.3 9 Colonial judges were dependent on
the Crown and its appointed agents not only for the legal authority to act,
but also at a practical level for their tenure of office and, ultimately, their
36 See id. at 681.
17 See COMMISSION OF SIR EDMUND ANDROS FOR THE DOMINION OF NEW
ENGLAND, APRIL 7, 1688, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/mass06.htm;
FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA, MAY 5, 1682,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa04.htm.
38 Several other methods were employed to control the colonial judiciary. For
example, under the direction of the Privy Council, a system of legislative review
was constructed that vested in the Council to the Board of Trade the authority to
screen colonial acts for conformity to English Law. See Kaufman, supra note 35,
at 679. Moreover, the British created a right of appeal to London in all cases where
the dispute involved more than £300. See Burkeley N. Riggs & Tamera D.
Westerberg, Judicial Independence: An Historical Perspective, 74 DENV. U. L.
REV. 337, 350 (1997) (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 49 (2d ed. 1985)).
'9 See, e.g., CHARTER FOR THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA-1681,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/pa0l.htm.
AND wee doe likewise give and grant unto the said William Penn, and
his heires, and to his and their Deputies and Lieutenants, full power and
authoritie to appoint and establish any Judges and Justices, Magistrates and
Officers whatsoever, for what Causes soever for the probates of wills, and
for the granting of Administrations within the precincts aforesaid and with
what Power soever, and in such forme as to the said William Penn or his
heires shall seeme most convenient ....
Id.; see Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209 (1993); see also Joseph H. Smith,
An Independent Judiciary: The Colonial Background, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1104,
1111-12 (1976) ("Commissions to governors in the royal colonies were silent on
the gubernatorial power to remove judges from office. It was apparently under-
stood, however, that the removal power was possessed by implication, because at
an early period the Crown issued instructions to control the circumstances of such
removal."). Early disputes over control of the judiciary, and particularly judicial
tenure, occurred in Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, and Massachusetts.
See generally Kaufman, supra note 35, at 680-83.
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salaries.4" Under the Massachusetts Government Act of 1774, Parliament
required that all judicial appointees in the Bay Colony serve at the pleasure
of the Crown.4' The Crown's continued control of the colonies,
dramatically symbolized by its control of and encroachment upon the
independence of colonial judges,42 was met with stiff opposition. As
Professors Charles Gardner Geyh and Emily Field Van Tassell observed:
"The dependence of colonial courts on the English monarch was among the
flashpoints that sparked the Declaration of Independence."43
In the aftermath of independence, states sought to insulate the judiciary
and the exercise ofjudicial power from the perceived ills of crown rule by
severely limiting the authority of the executive to encroach upon the
0 See Smith, supra note 39, at 1104. Smith notes that controversies surrounding
judicial independence in the colonies generally centered on two points:
First, the Crown rigidly adhered to the policy that judges in the royal
colonies, and even in proprietary Pennsylvania, should hold office during
pleasure... rather than during good behavior .... This policy was carried
out largely by royal instructions to colonial Governors, disobedience of
which could result in dismissal, and by royal disallowance of colonial acts
of assembly providing for judicial tenure during good behavior. Second, the
ministry decided in 1772 to implement the provisions of the Townshend
Revenue Act of 1767 by paying the salaries of the Superior Court judges in
Massachusetts Bay. This not only made these judges independent of the
popular branch of the legislature, but also, in the opinion of most patriotic
colonials, provided the funds by an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing
power of Parliament.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
4" See Kaufman, supra note 35, at 683; THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ACT,
MAY 20, 1774, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/amerrev/parliament/
admin ofjusticeact.htm.
42 One example of British intrusion on colonial judicial affairs is The
Administration of Justice Act of 1774. See sources cited supra note 41. This act,
among other things, placed strict controls on colonial judges' authority to act in
cases concerning charges against colonial authorities involved in suppressing the
insurrection or collecting revenues in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. In some
circumstances the Act completely divested colonial judicial authorities of
jurisdiction to try alleged criminals; in other cases the Act vested colonial
governors with broad authority. See sources cited supra note 41.
4" Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassell, The Independence of the
Judicial Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31,35 (1998); see also
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, paras. 10, 11 (U.S. 1776) ("He has obstructed
the administration of justice, by refusing his assent to laws for establishing
judiciary powers. He has made judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure
of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.").
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authority of judges, particularly with regards to such matters as
appointment, tenure, and salary." One must recall that under British
colonial rule, crown-appointed authorities possessed enormous power not
only over the judiciary, but also over colonial assemblies. Thus, although
legislatures viewed with suspicion and concern the power of the executive
to interfere in the judiciary,45 they did not have similar reservations
regarding their own power to interfere.46 In Delaware, for instance, the
"Other provisions also sought to limit both the power and influence of state
governors. Term limits, for example, are not a new concept. Maryland provided in
its 1776 Constitution, "That the governor shall not continue in that office longer
than three years successively, nor be eligible as Governor, until the expiration of
four years after he shall have been out of that office." See MD. CONST. OF 1776, art.
XXXI, http://yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/ma02.htm. Likewise, Georgia strictly
regulated the power of the governor to grant pardons, generally leaving that matter
to the consent of the state legislature. See GA. CONST. OF 1777, art. XIX,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/ga02.htm Virginia's 1776 constitution
provided, "A Governor, or chiefmagistrate, shall be chosen annually byjoint ballot
of both Houses ... who shall not continue in that office longer than three years
successively nor be eligible, until the expiration of four years after he shall have
been out of that office." See VA. CONST. OF 1776,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/va05.htm.
It should be noted that before the adoption of the federal Constitution, virtually
all matters were tried in state courts, with no appeal---even in cases concerning
interstate and national issues--to a "federal" court. Alexander Hamilton argued for
the creation of an independent federal judiciary, noting: "In unfolding the defects
of the existing confederation, the utility and necessity of a federal judicature have
been clearly pointed out." FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 401 (Alexander
Hamilton). However, not all of the Founders supported the notion of creating a
strong federal judiciary. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 22, at 37-49.
"5 It may be asserted that legislatures generally viewed the executive with
suspicion. One of the fundamental issues confronted by the Founders was the status
of the executive branch. Alexander Hamilton advocated a strong executive, even
a limited monarchy, while others, who feared the concentration of authority in one
person, sought to weaken the executive with respect to judicial appointments. Such
a view was voiced by Mr. Bedford at the convention. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 22, at 43.
4 For example, the Maryland Constitution of 1776 provided:
[T]he Chancellor and Judges ought to hold commissions during good
behaviour; and the said Chancellor and Judges shall be removed for
misbehaviour, on conviction in a court of law, and may be removed by the
Governor, upon the address of the General Assembly; Provided, That two-
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president and general assembly, by joint ballot, appointed the three justices
of the state supreme court.4 7 Moreover, the president, sitting with six other
persons appointed by the legislative council and House of Assembly, sat as
a court of appeals to review decisions of the supreme court.48 North
thirds of all the members of each House concur in such address. That
salaries, liberal, but not profuse, ought to be secured to the Chancellor and
the Judges, during the continuance of their Commissions, in such manner,
and at such times, as the Legislature shall hereafter direct, upon consider-
ation of the circumstances of this State. No Chancellor or Judge ought to
hold any other office, civil or military, or receive fees or perquisites of.any
kind.
MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXX, http:// www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/ states/
ma02.htm (emphasis added).
Similarly, New Jersey's 1776 Constitution provided:
[T]he Judges of the Supreme Court shall continue in office for seven years:
the Judges of the Inferior Court of Common Pleas in the several counties
... shall continue in office for five years... and that they shall be severally
appointed by the Council and Assembly .... Provided always, that the said
officers, severally, shall be capable of being re-appointed, at the end of the
terms severally before limited; and that any of the said officers shall be
liable to be dismissed, when adjudged guilty of misbehaviour, by the
Council, on an impeachment of the Assembly.
N.J. CONST. OF 1776, art. XII, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/nj 15.htm;
see also N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/
ny0l.htm ("[N]ew commissions shall be issued to judges of the county courts...
and to justices of the peace, once at least in every three years.").
47 DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. XII, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/
states/de02.htm#artl2 ("The president and general assembly shall by joint ballot
appoint three justices of the supreme court for the State, one of whom shall be chief
justice, and a judge of admiralty, and also four justices of the courts of common
pleas and orphans' courts for each county .. "). The 1776 Delaware Constitution
also provided that which judges had longed for under colonial rule--tenure in
office during good behavior and a fixed salary. As to the salary issue, the
constitution was silent on whether it was "fixed" such that it could not be altered
during time in office. Id.48 See id. art. XVII.
There shall be an appeal from the supreme court of Delaware, in matters
of law and equity, to a court of seven persons, to consist of the president for
the time being, who shall preside therein, and six others, to be appointed,
three by the legislative council, and three by the house of assembly, who
shall continue in office during good behavior, and be commissioned by the




Carolina,49 South Carolina,5" and Virginia 5' provided that their legislative
bodies alone would nominate and appoint judges. Under the Articles of
Confederation, even Congress played a role in the appointment of judges
and the adjudication of disputes.5 2 In some cases, the distinction between
legislative power and judicial power 3 was barely discernible, if it existed
49 See N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XIII, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/state
s/nc07.htm ("That the General Assembly shall, by joint ballot of both houses,
appoint Judges of the Supreme Courts of Law and Equity, Judges of
Admiralty ... who shall be commissioned by the Governor, and hold their offices
during good behavior.").
50 See S.C. CONST. OF 1776, arts. XIX-XX, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalo
n/states/scO1 .htm.
That justices of the peace shall be nominated by the general assembly
and commissioned by the president and commander-in-chief, during
pleasure. They shall not be entitled to fees except on prosecutions for
felony, and not acting in the magistracy, they shall not be entitled to the
privileges allowed to them by law.
That all other judicial officers shall be chosen by ballot, jointly by the
general assembly and legislative council, and except the judges of the court
of chancery, commissioned by the president and commander-in-chief,
during good behavior, but shall be removed on address of the general
assembly and legislative council.
Id.
"' See VA. CONST. OF 1776, ("The two Houses of Assembly shall, by joint
ballot, appoint Judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals, and General Court, Judges
in Chancery, Judges of Admiralty, Secretary, and the Attorney-General, to be
commissioned by the Governor, and continue in office during good behaviour.").
52 The Articles of Confederation recognized the legislative branch as the
dominant governmental force at the national level. The Articles vested in Congress
the limited authority to appoint "courts for the trial of piracies and felonies
conunitted on the high seas and establishing courts for receiving and determining
finally appeals in all cases of captures, provided that no member of Congress shall
be appointed a judge of any of the said courts." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art.
IX, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/artconf.htm. Moreover, Congress
performed an adjudicatory role in that it was "the last resort on appeal in all
disputes and differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between two or
more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any other causes whatever." Id.
" "Judicial power" may generally be defined as the power to adjudicate
disputes according to the law and to issue binding judgments. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 851 (7th ed. 1999). Additionally, in the United States, "judicial
power" includes the power of the courts to take measure of and strike down
legislative actions that contravene the Constitution. Chief Justice Marshall
described this function as "the very essence ofjudicial duty." Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 178 (1803); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
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at all.54 The Founders viewed the legislative branch as the dominant
governmental force, superceding the authority of both the executive and the
judiciary.55
The period following the Declaration of Independence saw a continuing
evolution in thinking regarding judicial independence at both the national
and state levels.56 Although early state charters may have resolved the issue
704 (1974).
54 See, e.g., N.J. CONST. OF 1776, art. IX, ("[T]he Governor and Council, (seven
whereof shall be a quorum) be the Court of Appeals, in the last resort, in all clauses
of law, as heretofore; and that they possess the power of granting pardons to
criminals, after condemnation, in all cases of treason, felony, or other offences.").
See also DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA, 1776,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/jeffcons.htm ("The judges of the General
court and of the High court of Chancery shall have session and deliberative voice,
but not suffrage in the house of Senators."). Madison complained about the
structure of several state governments, noting:
It is but too obvious that, in some instances, the fundamental principle
under consideration has been violated by too great a mixture, and even an
actual consolidation of the different powers; and that in no instance has a
competent provision been made for maintaining in practice the separation
delineated on paper.
THE FEDERALISTNO. 47, supra note 33, at 255 (James Madison); see also VARIANT
TEXTS OF THE VIRGINIA PLAN, PRESENTED BY EDMUND RANDOLPH TO THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION, MAY 29, 1787, TEXT A,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/vatexta.htm [hereinafter VARIANT
TEXTS]. Randolph's plan called for the creation of a national legislature that would
select both the national executive and the members of the national judiciary. The
plan also allowed each branch of government to originate acts, and further provided
that the national executive, sitting as a council of revision with a number of the
members of the national judiciary, would review and approve acts of the
legislature. The various plans introduced to the Constitutional Convention evidence
that, far from being a predetermined concept, the separation of powers principle
was neither universally understood by the Framers nor universally agreed to. Id.
" There is evidence that several Framers of the Constitution supported
legislative election of both the national executive and members of the national
judiciary. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note
22, at 27-28; VARIANT TEXTS, supra note 54; PLAN OF CHARLES PINCKNEY, supra
note 26.
56 It has been suggested that the Founders' conceptual commitment to judicial
independence was a reaction to prior experiences under colonial rule, rather than
an outgrowth of a culture that promoted judicial independence as a core governing
principle. Consequently, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention lacked the
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of judicial separation from the executive, they did not resolve the issue of
judicial dependence upon the legislature. In 1784, for example, when a
New York court struck down a legislative enactment, lawmakers attempted
to remove the opinion writer from the bench." Judges in Rhode Island
faced a similar crisis when they struck down a legislative act.58 The state
legislature demanded that the judges appear and explain the grounds and
authority for declaring an act unconstitutional.59 When several of the judges
refused to appear, a motion was made to remove them from office.6' James
Madison noted these shenanigans when he argued for a separate federal
judiciary: "[In Rhode] Island the Judges who refused to execute an
unconstitutional law were displaced, and others substituted, by the
Legislatures who would be willing instruments of the wicked [and]
enthusiasm necessary to establish an institutionally independent branch of
government. The refusal to tackle the difficult issue of the structure of the federal
courts vis-A-vis state courts, and the willingness to delegate that matter to Congress,
"underscores the Founders' comparatively tepid interest in plumbing the depths of
the subject." Geyh & Van Tassell, supra note 43, at 53. The proposition that the
Founders paid little attention to the judiciary is supported by the lack of discussion
thereon during the Constitutional Convention; the notes of the Convention
overwhelmingly focus on the legislative and executive branches. See NOTES OF
RUFUS KING IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/const/king.htm; NOTES OF WILLIAM PATTERSON IN THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1787, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/patterson.htm; NOTES OF
MAJOR WILLIAM PIERCE (GEORGIA) IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/pierce.htm.
57 See Julius Goebel, Jr., 1 History of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, 133-37 (1971).
58 The matter involved the case of Trevett v. Weeden, an action brought against
a butcher who refused to accept paper currency for payment of a debt. See
Kaufman, supra note 35, at 685. To enforce the acceptance of its paper currency,
Rhode Island empowered the judiciary to act summarily, without ajury, against any
person who refused payment. When the case came to trial, the defendant argued
that the Rhode Island law unconstitutionally violated his fundamental right to a trial
by jury. Although the court dismissed the action for want ofjurisdiction, a majority
of its members expressed the opinion that the act was indeed unconstitutional. This
sparked a firestorm of protests from the legislature. Id. at 685 n.82.
" Georgia's first constitution specifically provided, "Every officer of the State
shall be liable to be called to account by the house of assembly." GA. CONST. OF
1777, art. XLIX, supra note 44. Whether this "accounting" to the legislature
applied to the judiciary is unclear.
60 GOEBEL, supra note 57, at 137-41. The motion was withdrawn when it was
pointed out that judges could only be removed for committing criminal acts. Id.
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arbitrary plans of their masters., 6' The concern that judicial power was
being encroached upon by the legislature contributed, in large measure, to
the delegation of that power to an entirely separate branch.62 Thomas
61 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 22,
at 28; see also 1 id. at 108 ("Checks, which will destroy the measures of an
interested majority-in this view a negative in the [Executive] is not only necessary
for its own safety, but for the safety of a minority in Danger of oppression from an
unjust and interested majority."). Madison's position on the independence of the
judiciary is quite confusing-evidencing at once a concern for that independence
while simultaneously acquiescing to traditional notions of judicial accountability
to the legislature. For example, Madison was apparently initially opposed to the
executive branch's having any appointment power, believing the judicial
appointments should be made by the Senate. See 1 id. at 126 (noting Madison's
opposition to a motion by Wilson that the executive appoint federal judges). Yet,
Madison also expressed concern over the independence of the judiciary from the
legislature, believing that the judiciary should join with the executive in a council
of revision of laws with a negative on legislative action. See 1 id. at 110 ("He
[Madison] was of opinion that by joining the Judges with Supreme Executive
Magistrate would be strictly proper, and would by no means interfere with that
indepence so much to be approved and distinguished in the several departments.").
Political intrusions into state judicial departments did not end with the Trevett v.
Weeden case. Even after the adoption of the Constitution creating a separate
judicial department, state judiciaries suffered attacks generated more by politics
than by substance. Jeffersonian Republicans in Pennsylvania sought to remove
Chief Judge Alexander Addison, and later sought to impeach the three Federalist
judges on the state's supreme court. For a general discussion on the Addison matter
and other attempts at removing judges, see SIMON, supra note 24, at 193-95.
Thomas Jefferson, hesitant to employ the lengthy impeachment process to remove
Federalist judges from the federal bench, privately advocated amending the
Constitution to provide a system in which judges could be removed by the
president on majority vote of both houses of the legislature. Id. at 195.
62 The federal Constitution was not the first instrument to establish a tripartite
government. Some early state constitutions specifically provided that governmental
power would be divided among three branches. See GA. CONST. OF 1777, art. I,
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/ga02.htm. However, it is questionable
whether the judiciary was functionally independent. For example, James Madison
observed that the distribution of government powers expressed in many early state
constitutions created nothing more than "parchment barriers" that did little to
protect the executive and judicial branches from legislative incursions. THE
FEDERALIST No. 48, at 256 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001). Madison further noted: "The salaries ofjudges, which the
constitution expressly requires to be fixed, had been occasionally varied; and cases
belonging to the judiciary department, frequently drawn within legislative
cognizance and determination." Id. at 259. Madison's greatest fear was that an
unchecked and unruly legislature would pass impotent, mutable, and unjust laws.
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Jefferson, who once described the judge as nothing more than a "mere
machine, 63 complained that the legislature's assumption of executive and
judicial powers rendered no opposition to "173 despots [who] would surely
be as oppressive as one."'
With the creation of an independent judiciary as the third branch of
government, uncertainty arose concerning the breadth and limits ofjudicial
power 6' and the courts' inherent power.' Most early constitutions,
including the newly devised federal Constitution, failed to define the nature
and breadth of judicial power, contributing to a long national tradition of
courts defining the limits of their authority. It was not enough for judges to
be insulated from political interference through fixed salary and good
behavior provisions. Needing insulation from the political branches, the
See JAMES MADISON, VICES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES,
1787, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v 1 ch5s 16.
63 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton (Aug. 26, 1776),
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/jefflett/let9.htm ("Let mercy be the character
of the lawgiver, but let the judge be a mere machine. The mercies of the law will
be dispensed equally [and] impartially to every description of men; those of the
judge, or of the executive power, will be the eccentric impulses of whimsical,
capricious designing man.").
64 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, Query XIII (1782),
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/jeffvir.htm. During the constitutional debates,
James Madison initially argued that the judiciary and executive should revise the
laws together. "An association of the Judges in [the executive's] revisionary
function [would] both double the advantage and diminish the danger. It [would]
also enable the Judiciary Department the better to defend itself [against] Legislative
encroachments." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra
note 22, at 138 (James Madison). Madison was particularly concerned about the
potential power of the legislature, noting that "[e]xperience in all the States had
evinced a powerful tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex.
This was the real source of danger to the American Constitutions .... 2 id. at 74.
6 5 Many of the notes of the debates at the Constitutional Convention portray the
extent to which the entire notion of "judicial power" was in flux. James Madison's
notes of June 4, 1787 evidence this fact. See, for example, Madison's notes on the
debates over the extent to which the executive branch should be allowed to negate
an act of the legislature and the extent to which the judiciary should be involved in
such actions. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra
note 22, at 96-104.
66 Even today there is considerable debate concerning the extent of a court's
inherent power and the authority of the legislature both to control the exercise of
such power and to undermine its use. See, e.g., Degen v. United States, 517 U.S.
820, 823 (1996) ("In many instances the inherent powers of the courts may be
controlled or overridden by statute or rule."); Commonwealth v. Morris, 771 A.2d
721, 738 (Pa. 200 1) ("However, exercise of inherent rights is not unlimited and can
be restricted by the legislature.").
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courts relied on the notions of inherent powers and judicial review to create
an "institution."67 However, many early constitutions failed to define the
nature and breadth of judicial authority, contributing to a long national
tradition of courts defining the limits of their own power. Early in the
nation's history, therefore, courts began to assert their largely self-defined
powers to gain control over the business of the judiciary and, more
importantly, to secure the role of the judiciary in governing the nation.6"
Even in the absence of particularized constitutional or statutory authority,
courts assumed the inherent power to issue process,69 manage property
seized under the authority of the court,
70 control the records of courts, 7'
regulate the bar,72 punish contemptuous acts,73 ensure proper court
67 See, e.g., Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 18 (1825) ("Every
Court has, like every other public political body, the power necessary and proper
to provide for the orderly conduct of its business."). Chief Justice Marshall noted,
however, that Congress possessed significant control over the process and
procedures of the federal courts, restraining the Courts' inherent powers. Id. at 27.
But see Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1218 (1 lth Cir. 1985) ("The
doctrine [of forum non conveniens] derives from the court's inherent power, under
article III of the Constitution, to control the administration of the litigation before
it and to prevent its process from becoming an instrument of abuse, injustice and
oppression."). Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's landmark decision inMarbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), as late as 1815 Thomas Jefferson argued
that the legislature had a right and obligation to expound on the meaning of the law.
Writing to W.H. Torrance, Jefferson stated,
[T]his opinion which ascribes exclusive exposition to the legislature, merits
respect for its safety, there being in the body of the nation a control over
them, which, if expressed by rejection on the subsequent exercise of their
elective franchise, enlists public opinion against their exposition, and
encourages a judge or executive on a future occasion to adhere to their
former opinion.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to W.H. Torrance, supra note 19.
68 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 ("It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws
conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each."); cf
William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits on
Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 761 (1997) (arguing that courts' inherent
powers prohibit Congress from unduly restraining courts' discretion though rules
of procedure).
69 See Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
70 See Place v. City of Norwich, 19 F. Cas. 792 (E.D.N.Y. 1866).
7' See Talladega Ins. Co. v. Landers, 43 Ala. 115 (1869).
72 See Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149 (1860).
73 See State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 (1855).
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decorum, 74 and prevent abuse of judicial process;75 these powers
complemented the power ofjudicial review. Although inherent power was
recognized, not all courts were comfortable with the notion. One member
of the Ohio Supreme Court wryly observed,
Perhaps it may be thought... the court might make such an order by its
inherent power. But this inherent power is a thing I do not well
understand. It may comprehend much, it may comprehend but little. I am
satisfied with the powers expressly delegated, and unwilling to assume
any by implication.76
Three important points can be gleaned from the early history ofjudicial
power and judicial independence in America. First, it is clear that the
judiciary has not always enjoyed broad "independence," especially in an
institutional sense as many understand it today. Early history indicates that
the judiciary was not understood as a completely autonomous and
independent institution of government, and, in some quarters, may not be
viewed as such even today. Early constitutions sought foremost to prevent
the concentration of governmental power (including judicial power) in
individuals or groups of individuals. These constitutions did not necessarily
seek to sever judicial power from that of the other branches.77 Many of the
early constitutions and historical documents provide evidence supporting
the proposition that the judiciary was quite dependent upon the legislature
and, in some cases, clearly viewed as subservient to, if distinct from, that
body. Judicial power was personal not institutional; it flowed from the
constitutions to individual judges as a means of deciding cases rather than
governing the nation. Although early state constitutions sought to
distinguish the judiciary from the executive, they did not necessarily seek
to divorce the judiciary from control of the people as expressed through
74 See Killpatrick v. Frost, 2 Grant 168 (Pa. 1859).
" See Hood Irvine v. Kean, 11 Serg. & Rawle 280 (Pa. 1824).
76 Way v. Hillier, 16 Ohio 105, 108-09 (1847).
" See, e.g., DRAFT CONSTITUTION FOR VIRGINIA, JUNE 1776, http://www.yale.ed
u/lawweb/avalon/jeffcons.htm ("The Legislative, Executive and Judiciary offices
shall be kept forever separate; no person exercising the one shall be capable of
appointment to the others, or to either of them."). However, though the draft
proposed complete separation of governmental power at a theoretical level,
practical entanglements continued to exist within the document. See supra notes 51,
54, & 62.
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their elected representatives in the legislature.78 As Professor Gordon Wood
observes:
These constitutional provisions giving control of the courts and judicial
tenure to the legislatures actually represented the culmination of what the
colonial assemblies had been struggling for in their eighteenth-century
contests with the Crown. The Revolutionaries had no intention of
curtailing legislative interference in the court structure and in judicial
functions, and in fact they meant to increase it.
79
Second, while courts have defended the principle of inherent powers
and used those powers throughout the nation's history, their use has been
quite modest and restrained. This may reflect some uneasiness with this
largely self-defined power. The early use of inherent power centered not on
compelling needed resources (as it is increasingly used today), but on
defending the fundamental powers of the courts to decide cases impartially
and enforce their decisions. Early examples of the use of inherent power
included preventing abuse of judicial proceedings, punishing contempt,
enforcing judgments, and ensuring proper respect for court proceedings.8°
The use of inherent powers, therefore, generally related to the judiciary's
adjudicative role in securing the authority needed for proper adjudication,8
not necessarily its role in protecting its institutional status or budget.82
Consequently, inherent powers were most frequently used not to defend the
7' For example, during the federal Constitution ratification debates in South
Carolina, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney noted that "The laws which are to regulate
trials must be made by the representatives of the people chosen as this house are,
and as amenable as they are for every part of their conduct." Ryan, supra note 68,
at 769.
79 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787,
at 161 (1969). Jefferson became very concerned with the capacity of his state's
judiciary to protect itself from legislative interference. Jefferson wrote:
The judiciary... members were left dependent on the legislative, for their
subsistence in office, and some of them for their continuance in it. If
therefore the legislature assumes ... judiciary powers, no opposition is
likely to be made; nor, if made, can it be effectual; because in that case they
may put their proceedings into the form of an act of assembly, which will
render them obligatory on the other branches. They have accordingly, in
many instances, decided rights which should have been left to judiciary
controversy ....
JEFFERSON, supra note 64, at Query XIII.
80 See supra notes 69-75.
8' See, e.g., Lyon v. M'Manus, 4 Binn. 167 (Pa. 1811).
82 See, e.g., Beall v. Ex'rs of Fox, 4 Ga. 404 (1848).
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judiciary against intrusion by the coordinate branches of government, but
instead to ensure the fundamental legitimacy and enforceability of court
decisions on litigants and, by extension, the larger community.83 Many
courts were clearly uncomfortable with the notion of inherent power,
particularly when its use might invade the customary territory of the other
branches of government.84 The use of inherent power to compel funding for
the judiciary's direct operations is therefore a modem use more than an
historical artifact.
Finally, in the early days of the republic and throughout much of the
nation's history, concerns with judicial independence centered on
decisional independence--that is, insulating the act ofjudgment from the
machinations of the political branches, particularly the legislature.85 Broad
decisional independence was viewed as imposing a limitation on the power
of the legislature to dictate the outcome of individual cases; it provided an
additional check on legislative and executive tyranny.86 The states sought
to provide judges with needed insulation through so-called "good behavior"
and "fixed compensation" provisions, which had a basis in English law and
were simply "carried" into the design of American government.87 It was
83 See, e.g., Durham v. Lewiston, 4 Me. 140 (1826).
See, e.g., Harrison v. Nixon, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 483 (1835); Gallego's Ex'rs v.
Attorney Gen., 30 Va. 450 (1832), overruled by Trs. of Gen. Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church v. Guthrie, 10 S.E. 318 (Va. 1889), and Protestant Episcopal
Educ. Soc. v. Churchman, 80 Va. 718 (1885).
85 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton).
Hamilton argued that "there is no liberty, if the power ofjudging be not separated
from the legislative and executive powers." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting
Montesquieu); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 33, at 251-52 (James
Madison) ("[W]ere the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and
liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would
then be the legislator." (quoting Montesquieu)).
86 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 405 (Alexander Hamilton).
If then the courts ofjustice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited
constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford
a strong argument for the permanent tenure ofjudicial offices, since nothing
will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which
must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.
Id.
"7 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges... shall hold their Offices
during good Behavior .... ."); ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 150 ("The justices of the
supreme court, chancellors, and the judges of the circuit courts and other courts of
record, except probate courts, shall, at stated times, receive for their services a
compensation which shall not be diminished during their official terms .... );
COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 18 ("Justices and judges of courts of record shall receive
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thought that these provisions alone would provide judges the freedom to
decide cases free of pressure from the political branches of government or
the public--pressure that would undermine the rule of law and -the
legitimacy of court decisions.
However, the federal and various state constitutions, so deeply
concerned with a judge's decisional independence, were largely silent on
the "institutional status" of the courts as a separate branch of government.88
such compensation as may be provided by law, which may be increased but may
not be decreased during their term of office and shall receive such pension or
retirement benefits as may be provided by law."); MASS. CONST. Ch. III, art. I ("All
judicial officers, duly appointed, commissioned and sworn, shall hold their offices
during good behavior, excepting such concerning whom there is different provision
made in this constitution: provided nevertheless, the governor, with consent of the
council, may remove them upon the address of both houses of the legislature.");
MO. CONST. art. V, § 20 ("[N]o judge's salary shall be diminished during his term
of office."); OHIO CONST. § 4.06(B) ("The judges of the Supreme Court, courts of
appeals, courts of common pleas, and divisions thereof, and of all courts of record
established by law, shall, at stated times, receive, for their services such compensa-
tion as may be provided by law, which shall not be diminished during their term of
office."); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 14. ("The salaries ofjustices and judges shall
not be diminished during their terms of office.").
Unlike the federal constitution, state court judges generally serve for fixed
terms and are subject to removal for a broad range of offenses. See, e.g., Mo.
CONST. art. V, § 24 (stipulating that judges may be removed from office when
unable to discharge their judicial duties due to permanent sickness, physical or
mental infirmity, commission of a crime, misconduct, habitual drunkenness, willful
neglect of duties, corruption, incompetence, or any other offense involving moral
turpitude or oppression in office); N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22 ("[A] judge or justice
[may] be admonished, censured or removed from office for cause, including, but
not limited to, misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform his or her duties,
habitual intemperance, and conduct, on or off the bench, prejudicial to the
administration ofjustice, or that a judge or justice be retired for mental or physical
disability preventing the proper performance of his or her judicial duties."); S.D.
CONST. art. V, § 9 ("[T]he Supreme Court, after hearing, may censure, remove or
retire a justice or judge for action which constitutes willful misconduct in office,
willful and persistent failure to perform his duties, habitual intemperance, disability
that seriously interferes with the performance of the duties or conduct prejudicial
to the administration ofjustice which brings ajudicial office into disrepute.") Many
states provide for removal ofjudges by the state supreme court or other mechanism
short of formal impeachment. See infra note 121.
88 One relatively modem example is the 1901 Alabama Constitution, which
provided that the judicial power of the state was
vested in the senate sitting as a court of impeachment, a supreme court,
circuit courts, chancery courts, courts of probate, such courts of law and
equity inferior to the supreme court, and to consist of not more than five
members, as the legislature from time to time may establish, and such
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Unlike the legislative and executive branches, which had to (and must) act
"institutionally" to accomplish certain acts, judges could (and can) act
without regard to the judiciary's institutional nature by concentrating on
their independent (and individual) judgment. Constitutions were designed
to protect this act ofjudgment, and largely failed to consider the corporate,
institutional, or systematic structure of the judicial branch.
In the years leading up to the drafting of the federal constitution and
revision of many state constitutions, it became clear that, although "good
behavior" and "fixed compensation" provisions ensured some modicum of
independence in the exercise of judicial duties, these provisions did not
provide the judiciary with the tools necessary to prevent legislative
interference in the exercise of judicial power.89 Jefferson, Hamilton, and
Madison all expressed dismay with legislative encroachment on the
judiciary.9" Continued encroachment upon the judiciary, combined with
growing concern over "legislative tyranny," resulted in the separation of
judicial power from legislative and executive power.9 This separation of
persons as may be by law invested with powers of a judicial nature; but no
court of general jurisdiction, at law or in equity, or both, shall hereafter be
established in and for any one county having a population of less than
twenty thousand, according to the next preceding federal census, and
property assessed for taxation at a less valuation than three million five
hundred thousand dollars.
ALA. CONST. OF 1901, art. VI, § 139.
" The idea of courts as separate government entities existed prior to the
adoption of the Constitution. As early as 1776, John Adams advocated in his
writings on the Virginia Constitution for an independent judiciary "so it may be a
check upon both [the executive and legislative branches]." Geyh & Van Tassell,
supra note 43, at 36. He did not, however, win the debate. Id.; GOEBEL, supra note
57, at 9.
90 See supra notes 61, 64.
9' Hamilton further observed:
This simple view of the matter suggests several important consequences. It
proves incontestably that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of
the three departments of power; that it can never attack with success either
of the other two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend
itself against their attacks. It equally proves, that though individual
oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the
general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter: I
mean, so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the
legislature and the executive. For I agree that "there is no liberty, if the
power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers." And it proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing to
fear from the judiciary alone, but would have everything to fear from its
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judicial power is the hallmark of American government; that judges enjoy
tenure during good behavior and have fixed compensation are merely
conceptual holdovers from the British judicial tradition.
It must be emphasized, however, that early efforts to separate judicial
power from that of the other branches did not de facto give rise to an
"institutional" court system as it is understood today. The early focus of
separating judicial power remained on ensuring that the act ofjudgment
could be exercised impartially and independently of the coordinate
branches of government. Constitutions of the era, therefore, were generally
silent on the institutional structure and status of the courts; the matter was
frequently left to the determination of the legislature or the courts. 92
Consequently, unlike the legislature, which from its very early stages
possessed an institutional structure and status,93 the judiciary's status and
union with either of the other departments; that as all the effects of such a
union must ensue from a dependence of the former on the latter ....
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 402-03 (Alexander Hamilton) (quoting
Montesquieu). Thomas Jefferson expressed like concern with the potential for
legislative tyranny when he wrote:
All the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary, result
to the legislative body. The concentrating these in the same hands is
precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation that
these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a single
one. 173 despots would surely be as oppressive as one.
JEFFERSON, supra note 64, at Query XIII. But see supra note 19 (noting that, in
letters, Jefferson expresses suspicion of the judiciary).
92 Even today many state constitutions vest the state legislature with the power
to establish new courts (which in limited circumstances implies the power to
disestablish them), to determine the divisions of the trial and intermediate appellate
courts, and to establish the number of judgeships within the state. Thus the
structure of state and federal courts remains a matter squarely within the purview
of the legislature. This tradition of legislative control over the structure of courts
is rooted in debates at the Constitutional Convention. For example, at the federal
level, the authority of Congress to establish courts was as much a matter of political
compromise as one of structural thinking. Vesting Congress with constitutional
authority to establish federal courts was meant to assuage Anti-Federalist concerns
"that a national judiciary would usurp the role of the state courts." Geyh & Van
Tassell, supra note 43, at 45.
" For example, from early on many state constitutions provided that the
legislature alone was the judge of its elections and the qualifications of its members
and this tradition continues today. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. II, § 8; FLA. CONST.
art. 111, § 2; Ky. CONST. § 38; MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 6. For a discussion on the
meaning of such constitutional provisions, see McIntyre v. Wick, 558 N.W.2d 347,
351 n.l (S.D. 1996) (construing S.D. CONST. art. III, § 9). In addition, state
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structure were largely undefined and dependent upon the imprimatur and
affirmative assent of the legislature.94 Notwithstanding early moves to
separate judicial power from legislative and executive power, there was
clearly no intention to create a completely autonomous judicial department
in the modem institutional sense.95 Contrary to the assertions of Jefferson,96
the Framers did not create three branches of government existing
independently of one another.97 Rather, they created a government in which
constitutions generally give the state legislature the exclusive authority to determine
the rules governing proceedings within the body. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. IV,
§ 7 ("Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, sit upon its own
adjournment, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence
of two-thirds expel a member; but no member shall be expelled a second time for
the same offense.").
94 Notwithstanding the grounding of state court jurisdiction directly in
constitutions, discussed infra note 157, many state legislatures continue to possess
significant power over the structure of state court systems. See, e.g., ALA. CONST.
art. VI, § 145; CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 22 & 23; CONN. CONST. art. V, § 1; KAN.
CONST. art. 3, § 6; R.I. CONST. art. X, § 1; see also infra notes 131-36.
" See Ryan, supra note 68. But see N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982) (superseded by statute as stated inln re Grabill
Corp., 967 F.2d 1152 (7th Cir. 1992)). Justice Brennan wrote "[O]ur Constitution
unambiguously enunciates a fundamental principle--that the 'judicial Power of the
United States' must be reposed in an independent Judiciary. It commands that the
independence of the Judiciary be jealously guarded, and it provides clear
institutional protections for that independence." Marathon, 458 U.S. 60; cf Riggs
& Westerberg, supra note 38, at 337 (noting that, despite a tradition of judicial
autonomy in the U.S., "unpopular [recent] decisions have led to calls for greater
political control over the judiciary"). Yet even today, the institutional independence
that Justice Brennan declared remains largely vague, undefined, and grounded in
the notion that the courts enjoy institutional independence as an extension of a
judge's decisional independence, which is protected by tenure and compensation
provisions.
96 See supra note 19.
9' As the Founders understood the concept of separation of powers, the doctrine
operated on two distinct levels. First, there was a division of governmental
authority between the states and the national government, with the former retaining
the power not specifically given to the latter. Second, the authority confined to each
level of the government was then further diffused across three separate and co-
equal departments, each capable of checking the actions of the other branches
through the unique powers confined to it. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 270
(James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellen eds., 2001).
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people, is submitted
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the three branches possess separate but interdependent powers, in which
judicial interdependence is most prominent. 98
Accordingly, modem concepts of the judiciary's institutional
independence-which embraces the broad, self-governing independence
that exists apart from the act of independent judgment-are the result of a
long evolutionary process, not the product of universal acceptance present
at the foundation of the Republic.99 The Framers did not reject a dependent
to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are
guarded against, by a division of the government into distinct and separate
departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered
by the people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and then
the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.
Id.; cf Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 368 (1989) (finding that a statute
giving a judicial panel "rulemaking authority" to devise sentencing guidelines
violated separation of powers principles).
98 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot
conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on
isolated clauses or even single Articles tom from context. While the
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates
that practice will integrate the dispersed power into a workable government.
It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy
but reciprocity.
Id. As to the judiciary's dependence on the other branches, ChiefJustice Rehnquist
noted:
I am struck by the paradox ofjudicial independence in the United States: we
have as independent a judiciary as I know of in any democracy, and yet the
judges are very much dependent on the Legislative and Executive branches
for the enactment of laws to enable the judiciary to do a better job of
administering justice.
CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM'RS, WHITE PAPER ON EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL
GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY iv (2001), http://cosca.ncsc.dni.us/
PositionPapers/judgovwhitepapr.pdf [hereinafter CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT
ADM'RS, JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE] (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist, 1996 Year-
End Report to the Federal Judiciary).
99 Compare Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The CivilJustice
Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1321 (1993)
("[O]nce Congress creates federal courts and vests them with jurisdiction, it must
also vest them with those powers necessary for them to administer justice and to
preserve their status as part of an independent branch." (footnote omitted)), with
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judiciary; they rejected a judiciary whose power-that is, the act of
judgment-was dangerously subject to unwarranted intrusions by the
executive and legislative branches, particularly with regards to the
decisional process.'00 To the extent that the other branches could influence
the individual act of judgment, judges could neither perform any
meaningful role in the system of checks and balances nor prevent tyranny
by limiting the concentration of power in individuals or small groups.'0 '
Then, as now, however, the legislature exercises dramatic control over the
judiciary and judicial process. 102 Today the judiciary must be cognizant of
this reality because reliance on an unqualified view of its independence
may convey an illusion of institutional separateness that is not supported
by the historical record.'0 3 Thus, while early history supports the perception
Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political
Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 707-08 (1995) ("[T]he federal judiciary has
been expressly confined to the exercise of the traditional judicial function of case
adjudication. Unless limited in this manner, the largely unrepresentative and
unaccountable federal judiciary could threaten the fundamental principle of
representationalism by usurping the policymaking power the legislative and
executive branches traditionally exercise." (footnote omitted)).
100 Even Alexander Hamilton recognized the dependency of the judiciary,
contending that its legitimacy rested upon the effectuation ofjudicial decisions by
the executive branch. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
101 See Geyh & Van Tassell, supra note 43, at 36.
102 See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136 (1992) ("From almost
the founding days of this country, it has been firmly established that
Congress... may enact laws regulating the conduct of... courts ... " (footnote
omitted)); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) ("[T]he constitutional
provision for a federal court system ... carries with it the congressional power to
make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts .... "); United
States v. New Bedford Bridge, 27 F. Cas. 91, 105 (D.C. Mass. 1847) ("[T]he
federal courts derive theirjudicial power immediately from the constitution, but the
political truth is, that the disposal of the judicial power, except in a few specified
instances, belongs to congress. If congress has given the power to this court, we
possess it, not otherwise ...- (quoting Turner v. Bank of N. America, 4 U.S. (4
Dall.) 9 (1799))).
103 James Madison recognized the interdependency of the branches under the
federal Constitution. In THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 33, at 251, he wrote:
[Montesquieu's] meaning, as his own words import, and still more
conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to no more
than this, that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the
same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the
fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.
If we look to the state constitutions, we find that, notwithstanding the emphatic
and, in some instances, unqualified terms in which this axiom has been laid down,
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that courts possessed inherent power to compel certain actions, the extent
of that power as understood today is not a matter that can be resolved easily
or exclusively by looking to the historical record. 1
0 4
II. CHANGING PARADIGMS-COURTS IN THE MODERN AGE
Whether a state legislature may be compelled to fund judicial
operations is complicated, both legally and politically.' 5 Two factors have
added new complexity to the issue in recent years: (1) the evolution of large
state-funded judicial systems, which handle complex matters requiring a
broad range of court annexed services;' 6 and (2) the emergence of the
administratively powerful state supreme courts, which wield broad
supervisory authority and administrative control over the judiciary as an
institution. These developments have given rise to a more polished
perspective on judicial independence, which in turn has changed the
substantive and budgetary landscapes in which the judiciary and legislature
interact. Consequently, although a historical inquiry does not conclusively
there is not a single instance in which the several departments of power have been
kept absolutely separate.
"0 Even today the federal courts, unlike their state counterparts, remain largely
dependent on the legislature for a wide variety of powers, notwithstanding claims
of broad inherent powers. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of
Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2001).
Arguably, state court judges have a greater claim to "inherent" authority given that
many state constitutions specifically create the structure of the judiciary and its
jurisdiction, thus depriving the legislature of this authority.
'05 in order to compel a legislative body to fund judicial operations, courts must
make policy decisions concerning the use of limited public funds-decisions
traditionally in the province of the legislature. Yet the judiciary has no power to tax
or to appropriate money from the treasury. See In re Alamance County Court
Facilities, 405 S.E.2d 125, 130 (N.C. 1991).
"o The last forty years have seen an explosion not only in the amount of
litigation but also in the amount of law courts apply. Beginning in the 1950s and
accelerating through the 1960s, courts were confronted with a wide range of new
legal remedies and causes of action for which little if any "judge made" law
existed. There existed, for example, no long historical jurisprudence for housing
law, welfare law, environmental law, natural resource management, school
desegregation, or medical ethics. Taken singularly, the actions of courts in these
areas represent no great departure from the traditional notion ofjudges and courts
deciding cases; however, taken in their totality, they radically shaped the exercise




vindicate the use of inherent powers to compel funding, modem
developments support the existence of this practice, and may also justify it
in very limited circumstances.
A. Modern Court Systems
To appreciate the complexity of the current funding crisis and the
inherent power of courts to address this crisis, it is necessary to understand
the changing role of the judiciary and the rise of state courts as modem
governmental institutions. Courts-be they federal or state--have
historically enjoyed very limited institutional independence in the sense of
charting their "corporate" destinies." 7 Before the latter half of the twentieth
century, most state judges were locally elected officials,0 8 courts
107 For an excellent discussion on the limited institutional independence of the
federal courts in regards to rulemaking, see Ryan, supra note 68. Ryan notes,
"What's more, and what is often overlooked, is that the state ratification conven-
tions, The Federalist, and the original version of the Process Act of 1789 contain
potent evidence that several influential Framers and those adopting our Constitu-
tion also considered procedural rulemaking a legislative function." Id. at 767.
08 The election of state court judges has drawn some concern recently. For
instance, in 2003 the South Dakota legislature adopted a resolution placing on the
ballot for the next general election a measure that would end the process of electing
trial judges and adopt the "Missouri plan" currently in place for appellate judges
in the state. 2003 S.D. LAWS HJR 1003. Judicial elections and the impact of fund
raising on judicial decisions are topics of great interest to the American Bar
Association ("ABA"). The ABA recently noted,
They [state judicial systems] are being jeopardized by the corrosive effect
of money on judicial election campaigns ....
Such developments threaten to poison public trust and confidence in the
courts by fostering a series of perceived improprieties: that judges are less
than independent and impartial, that justice is for sale, and that justice is
available only to the wealthy and powerful or to political and racial
majorities.
ABA, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION ON THE 21ST
CENTURY JUDICIARY 1 (2003). During the 2004 Legislative Session, the Missouri
House of Representatives introduced a resolution calling for the repeal of merit-
selection and elimination of the "Missouri non-partisan court plan." The resolution
would replace merit selection with popular partisan election of all judges in the
state. See H.J.R. 50, 92d Gen. Assemb. 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2004). It is generally
thought that this measure was intended to express the Legislature's displeasure
with several court decisions.
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(particularly trial courts) were funded almost entirely by local govemments,
and the judiciary was viewed largely as an amalgamation of diffused
institutions, based mainly on a county or circuit model. 9
Consequently, local judges enjoyed independence from the coordinate
branches of govemment as well as from other judges and the judicial
institution as a whole." 0 A state supreme court, generally the only court
funded entirely from the state treasury, possessed little, if any, supervisory
or administrative authority over lower courts, and likewise possessed little
formal rulemaking authority with regard to process and procedure."' The
authority that a state supreme court exercised over lower courts was
generally confined to various writs and remedial actions, such as mandamus
and prohibition, or to the error-correcting appellate process."2 There was
'09 For one example of the evolution in court funding during the last half of the
twentieth century towards state funding, see ALA. CODE § 12-17-1 (2003).
10 Judicial individualism was even present at the beginnings of the federal
judiciary, and particularly in the Supreme Court. Prior to Marbury v. Madison, it
was traditional for each Supreme Court justice to write his own opinion of the case.
As Michael J. Glennon observed, "Before his [John Marshall's] appointment by
President Adams in 1801, the Court's six members wrote separate opinions,
limiting the Court's potential institutional strength. Marshall changed that. He
encouraged his colleagues to speak with one voice." Glennon, supra note 24, at 22.
"1 Even today some state legislatures fund only one court--the state supreme
court. In Ohio, for example, the legislature funds judges' salaries, but county
government finances the operational expenses of both the courts of appeals and the
courts of common pleas. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2501.18, .181 (Anderson
2004). By contrast, the state bears the full cost of operating the state supreme court.
See id. § 2503.05, .10.
..2 This was most certainly true at the federal level. In Harrison v. Nixon, 34 (9
Pet.) U.S. 483, 530 (1835) (footnotes omitted), the Supreme Court asserted:
There is no power so dangerous as that which can be traced to no
definite or authoritative source, or which is exercised without a reference
to some fixed principles; it is in the nature of that which is assumed by any
department of government, to be capable of no other limitation than such as
it may choose to prescribe to itself, while that which is conferred by the
constitution or statutes, is defined, limited and regulated in its exercise to
the cases specified, and in the mode prescribed. Such are the appellate
powers of the circuit and supreme courts of the United States; they are of
limited jurisdiction-necessarily incompetent to act by any prerogative or
inherent power; as the creatures of the judiciary act, they are not at liberty
to exercise any power over the proceedings of inferior courts, by any
general supervisory power, such as has been assumed by the king's bench
and house of lords. Their supervision is only by writ of error, or appeal, and
such writs as congress have authorised them to use; so that in whatever case
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virtually no administrative control and very little institutional identity.
Unlike the other branches of government, whose members had to act
collectively and institutionally to fulfill their constitutional duties, the
judiciary executed its constitutional duties through individual judges and
individual courts. It is questionable whether the judiciary possessed any
"institutional" identity akin to that retained by the legislative and executive
branches.
This diffusion of judicial power--both structurally and
geographically-created a culture in which the judiciary's primary actors
(judges) could act with finality without seeking bipartisan approval or
institutional consensus."13 In the truest sense, the system was designed to
promote the adjudicative independence of judges-not necessarily the
institutional independence of the judicial branch. This was particularly true
in trial courts level where, unlike in appellate courts, judges operated as
individual and independent actors controlling not only the decisional
process but also, in many circumstances, the attendant administrative
structure that supported that process. Individual independence was
generally prized over institutional autonomy; the judiciary enjoyed its
independence as a function and byproduct of each member's exercise of
individual independence. Judicial institutional autonomy, therefore, flowed
from the independence each judge enjoyed under a constitution, and not
necessarily because of the judiciary's institutional standing vis-a-vis the
other branches. Matters were complicated by the geographical and
structural diffusion of judicial power across various levels of courts in
they act as an appellate court, it is by special authority, and can exercise no
other than what is appropriately appellate, as contradistinguished from
original jurisdiction.
" Some may argue that, at least at the appellate level, courts need to build
consensus for their decisions just as the legislature does. To some extent this may
be true. However, even at the appellate level, judges enjoy much greater independ-
ence than their legislative counterparts. Although appellate courts must publish
"majority decisions" that decide the case, dissenting opinions are common. Thus,
unlike the legislative process, in which the majority can act with finality and the
minority position is largely forgotten in the process, majority and dissenting court
opinions are preserved for history: particular judges may hold their positions for
years notwithstanding the position of a majority of court members. Justices
Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan routinely dissented in cases affirming the
death penalty to preserve their opposition to capital punishment. See, e.g., Autry
v. Estelle, 464 U.S. 1, 3 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I continue to adhere to
my niew that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punish-
ment.").
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multiple locations. There arose not only an apparent tension between the
judiciary and the coordinate branches resulting from the constitutional
design of the government, but also an inherent tension within the judiciary
because its structure promoted individual independence over institutional
identity.
In many states, relationships within the judiciary and among the
judiciary and the coordinate branches of government slowly began
changing in the 1940s. The change was most dramatically evidenced by the
adoption of so-called "modem court" provisions.114 Before the adoption of
"' Unlike the federal Constitution, many state constitutions changed consider-
ably in the latter half of the twentieth century, and now reflect so-called "modem
court" provisions. In general, these constitutional provisions give the state supreme
courts significant rulemaking and superintending authority over the judicial branch.
There is no constitutional counterpart in the federal Constitution. For example, the
Missouri Constitution provides, "The supreme court shall have general superin-
tending control over all courts and tribunals.... Supervisory authority over all
courts is vested in the supreme court which may make appropriate delegations of
this power." Mo. CONST. art. V, § 4. also provides the rulemaking authority of the
Missouri Supreme Court. Likewise, the South Dakota Constitution provides,
The Supreme Court shall have general superintending powers over all
courts and may make rules of practice and procedure and rules governing
the administration of all courts. The Supreme Court by rule shall govern
terms of courts, admission to the bar, and discipline of members of the bar.
These rules may be changed by the Legislature.
S.D. CONST. art. V, § 12; see also ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15 ("The supreme
court shall make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts.
It shall make and promulgate rules governing practice and procedure in civil and
criminal cases in all courts. These rules may be changed by the legislature by two-
thirds vote of the members elected to each house."); COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 2(1)
("The supreme court, except as otherwise provided in this constitution, shall have
appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be coextensive with the state, and shall have
a general superintending control over all inferior courts, under such regulations and
limitations as may be prescribed by law."); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) ("The
supreme court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all courts
including the time for seeking appellate review [and] the administrative supervision
of all courts.. . ."); IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 2 ("The courts shall constitute a unified
and integrated judicial system for administration and supervision by the Supreme
Court."); ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 16 ("General administrative and supervisory
authority over all courts is vested in the Supreme Court and shall be exercised by
the Chief Justice in accordance with its rules."); IOWA CONST. art. V, § 4 ("The
supreme court shall.., exercise a supervisory and administrative control over all
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these provisions, most state courts operated with little regard for the
systematic and institutional structure of the judiciary." 5 Moreover, state
legislatures paid little attention to the administrative structure of the courts
or the associated costs of running them because very few courts were
funded directly from the state treasury.1 6 It should be noted, however, that
notwithstanding the changes of the last half-century, the Americanjudiciary
continues to function along the lines of individual adjudicatory
independence. What has changed is the degree to which the institutional
identity of the judiciary has eclipsed the functional independence of
individual judges, particularly on nondecisional, administrative matters
such as the budget.
Perhaps the greatest impact brought by the modem institutionalization
of the judiciary is an alteration of how courts view themselves. The
judiciary is increasingly confronted with a seemingly irreconcilable cultural
difference between its traditional "adjudicatory" independence, which
tends to be personal to judges, and a broad "institutional" independence,
which involves notions of collective purpose with its attendant budgetary
and political consequences." 7 Rather than existing as an almost voluntary
inferiorjudicial tribunals throughout the state."); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a) ("The
Court of Appeals from time to time shall adopt rules and regulations concerning the
practice and procedure in and the administration of the appellate courts and in the
other courts of this State, which shall have the force of law until rescinded,
changed or modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law."); MONT.
CONST. art. VII, § 2(2) ("[The supreme court] has general supervisory control over
all other courts."); OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(A)(1) ("In addition to all other powers
vested by this article in the supreme court, the supreme court shall have general
superintendence over all courts in the state. Such general superintending power
shall be exercised by the chiefjustice in accordance with rules promulgated by the
supreme court.").
"' See generally 4 STATE OF NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1947, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, (1947),
http://www.njstatelib.org/ResearchGuides/HistoricalDocuments/nj/NJCON06
.html.
116 The adoption of modem court provisions closely followed changes to the
structure of the other branches of state government. See generally MARYLAND
PROCEEDINGS ANDDEBATES OF THE 1967 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, Vol. 104,
http://www.mdarchives.state.md.us; Communications Workers of Am. v. Florio,
617 A.2d 223 (N.J. 1992). For a general discussion on the changes to state
governments after World War II, see G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE
CONSTITUTIONS (1998).
... See generally CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM'RS, JUDICIAL GOVER-
NANCE, supra note 98.
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association, the judicial branch has been pressured toward a new
interconnectedness by the consolidation of administrative control and
funding. The current budget crisis has only served to highlight the need for
an institutional response. This evolution has occurred at a moment in
history when the role of state courts is expanding rapidly. State judiciaries,
therefore, have emerged during the last half-century with a more robust
institutional identity and definition due to their growing influence, their
consolidation of power at the state level, and the explosion of programs
directly under their control. With the consolidation of control came the
recognition that the fate of one arm of the courts rested with the fate of all
arms of the courts. A voluntary association of independent actors could not
protect the broader interests of the judiciary as an autonomous institution
of government, particularly in responding to incursions by the Legislature.
Most modem court provisions generally possess three characteristics. "8
First, these provisions vest state supreme courts with broad rulemaking
authority over process and procedure, authority that in most cases is subject
to some form of legislative oversight." 9 Second, these provisions give state
supreme courts extensive superintending, supervisory, and administrative
authority over the day-to-day operations of courts in the state, including, in
some cases, a unified judicial budget. 2 ° Finally, these provisions frequently
"' The creation in some states of "judicial councils" to advise the supreme court
and legislature on the needs and operations of the judiciary often goes unrecog-
nized. These councils are usually comprised ofjudicial officers, administrators, and
citizens. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 8 & 9; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6;
UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 12.
119 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 16; HAW. CONST., art. VI, § 7; MONT.
CONST. art. VII, § 2; OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B). Unlike state supreme courts
operating under modem court provisions that vest constitutional authority for
rulemaking in the courts, the federal courts' authority to promulgate rules flows
from Congress. Congress has from its very first session asserted authority over
practice and procedure in the federal courts, as evidenced by the Process Act of
1789. Throughout the nation's history Congress has delegated some aspects of its
rulemaking authority to the federal courts, and does so today though the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2004). Nevertheless, Congress retains ultimate
authority over federal court process and procedure.
120 See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(b)(1); N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 11(3); N.D.
CONST. art. VI, § 3; OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5; S.D. CONST. art. V, § 11. Compare
MICH. CONST. OF 1835, art. VI, § 1 (vesting judicial power in one Supreme Court
and such other courts as legislature may establish), with MICH. CONST. art. VI, §
4 (vesting judicial power in one court of justice comprised of the Supreme Court,
court of appeals, circuit court, probate court, and courts of limited jurisdiction as
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created an alternative approach for dealing with judicial disciplinary
matters by removing the traditional process of legislative impeachment and
replacing it with independent commissions and state supreme court
control.121 With the advent of modern court administration, the creation of
specialized dockets,122 the explosive use of courts to resolve pressing social
issues, and the expansion of alternative judicial remedies, state judiciaries
were transformed from a disjointed group of locally elected judges into an
institution that not only rendered decisions but also provided a wide range
of judicial services, often at the behest of state legislatures and Congress.123
As a result of the structural changes over the last half-century, state
judiciaries have attained an institutional standing not previously enjoyed or
recognized by the coordinate branches of government. The growing
institutionalization of the courts, combined with the complexity and costs
of running large judicial systems, has given rise to broader claims of
institutional independence, particularly at the state level. These same
the legislature may establish by two-thirds vote). In addition to vesting superintend-
ing authority in state supreme courts, several states eliminated a multi-tiered trial-
court system in favor of a single-level system. See, e.g., S.D. CONST. art. V.
21 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 10; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 18; COLO.
CONST. art. VI, § 23; MO. CONST. art. V, § 24; UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13. But see
N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 24 (providing that judges may be removed only by
legislative impeachment); cf. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 17 (providing that judges may
be removed on concurrent resolution of both houses of general assembly).
22 Examples of specialized court dockets include drug courts, mental health
courts, teen courts, unified family courts, driving under the influence ("DUI")
courts, and specialized domestic violence courts. A discussion on these and other
trends affecting state courts can be found in NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 2002
REPORT ON TRENDS IN THE STATE COURTS (2002).
123 Two examples provide insight into how the state legislatures and Congress
have expanded the work of state courts. In Missouri, the state's general assembly
overrode the governor's veto of conceal-and-carry legislation. This legislation,
which permits citizens to carry concealed firearms under certain circumstances,
created elaborate court procedures that allowed individuals to contest the denial of
a permit or allowed other citizens to sue to contest the issuance of a permit. H.B.
349, 92d Sess., First Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2003). The constitutionality of this measure
has been challenged. See Brooks v. State, No. SC85674, 2004 WL 350937 (Mo.
Feb. 26, 2004). At the. national level, Congress enacted the Violence Against
Women Act in 1994, creating a new state court mechanism for handling domestic
abuse. This law greatly enhanced access to state courts, created interstate
enforcement obligations, and expanded state judicial involvement in domestic
violence. See Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
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changes also altered traditional relationships within the judiciary and
among the judiciary and the coordinate branches, especially the legislature.
These altered relationships have created a climate ripe for conflicts over the
breadth and limits of the judiciary's institutional independence and its
auxiliary authority to determine funding needs.'24
The current debate on the level of the judiciary's independence,
therefore, has much less to do with history than with the evolving and
expanding role of state courts in American society. With abortion,'25
euthanasia,' 26 environmental issues,127 election controversies, 28 and even
the legislative process itself, 29 state judiciaries have become the fora for
24 An example of the expanding role of courts can be seen in the creation of so-
called "specialty courts," "problem solving courts," and "therapeutic courts." Such
courts place the judiciary in a non-traditional role, focused not only on making
decisions and rendering judgments, but also on addressing underlying causes of
inappropriate behavior. See CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM'RS, POSITION
PAPER ON THERAPEUTIC COURTS 1 (1999), http://cosca.ncsc.dni.us/Position
Papers/therapeuticcourts.pdf; see also CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM'RS,
JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 98 ("Courts handling family cases, much like
a hospital trauma center, need to be structured to respond to families in crisis. In
family cases the role of the judge--and therefore the court systen--as adjudicator
is compatible with being a convener, mediator, facilitator, service provider, and
case manager.").
125 See, e.g., State v. Planned Parenthood, 35 P.3d 30 (Alaska 2001).
126 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
127 See, e.g., Bulk Terminals Co. v. EPA, 357 N.E.2d 430 (Ill. 1976); San
Joaquin Raptor/Wildlife Rescue Ctr. v. County of Stanislaus, 32 Cal. Rptr. 704
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
128 See, e.g., Thorsness v. Daschle, 285 N.W.2d 590 (S.D. 1979).
129 Two limitations placed on the legislative process formed a frequently
overlooked but highly critical development in state constitutional reforms. First,
states adopted so-called "single subject" provisions in their constitutions that
prevent legislatures from enacting large multi-subject omnibus bills. See, e.g.,
IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 16 ("Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters
properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title; but if
any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title,
such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be embraced in the
title."); MO. CONST. art. III, § 23 ("No bill shall contain more than one subject
which shall be expressed in its title.... "); S.D. CONST. art. III, § 21 ("No law shall
embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title.") For an
interpretation of Missouri's limitation, see Hammerschmidt v. Boone County, 877
S.W.2d 98, 100 (Mo. 1994). Second, several state constitutions now provide
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some of the most vexing political and social issues of our time. Unlike the
past, state courts are finding themselves at the center of, and not the
periphery of, many divisive political maelstroms.130 The shift to state
funding of the courts has complicated the debate regarding independence
because today's budgets and the availability of resources have as much to
do with the judiciary's independence as does its constitutional standing or
jurisprudential history. 3' It must be noted, however, that even with the
adoption of modem court provisions and the development of modem
judicial institutions, state courts clearly are not the sole masters of their
destiny. In particular, the legislative branch continues to exercise broad
direction over the courts by controlling such wide-ranging matters as
jurisdiction, 3 2 substantive procedures,'33 the creation and structure of the
limitations on "legislating through appropriations." See, e.g., S.D. CONST. art. XII,
§2
"The general appropriation bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations for
ordinary expenses of the executive, legislative and judicial departments of
the state, the current expenses of state institutions, interest on the public
debt, and for common schools. All other appropriations shall be made by
separate bills, each embracing but one object, and shall require a two-thirds
vote of all the members of each branch of the Legislature."
For an interpretation of the South Dakota provision, see S.D. Educ. Ass'n ex rel.
Roberts v. Barnett, 582 N.W.2d 386 (S.D. 1998); see also People ex rel. Fulton v.
O'Ryan, 204 P. 86 (Colo. 1922). These provisions and their interpretations
demonstrate that, unlike the federal judiciary, which is generally outside the scope
of the internal working of Congress, several state judiciaries are involved in the
internal workings of their legislatures in a very concrete manner. This point of
contention between the respective branches will only be further inflamed as the
subjects for judicial review become more divisive.
130 See, e.g., Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2000).
3,' From a historical budgetary perspective, for most of the nation's history,
state courts were locally funded institutions. This changed in the latter half of the
twentieth century as more states assumed responsibility for funding the judiciary.
The effect of the long history of local funding was to hide the overall costs of
operating state courts because of the diversified funding base. See supra notes
107-10 and accompanying text.
'
3 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 12-120.21, 12-123 (2003); IDAHO CODE § 1-
705 (Michie 2003); see also N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 30 ("The legislature shall have
the same power to alter and regulate the jurisdiction and proceedings in law and in
equity that it has heretofore exercised.").
133 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-19-272 (2003). But see People v. Leola B. (In re
Curtis B.), 784 N.E.2d 219 (I11. 2002) (holding that the legislature's attempt to
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courts, 134 budgets and personnel,"'" the promulgation of court rules,'36 and
even the subject matter of court rules.'37 Indeed, the development of
modem judicial institutions and the evolving role of the judiciary in
governing American society seems, at times, to conflict with historical and
traditional understandings of interbranch relations.
B. Emerging Perspective on Judicial Independence
The structural changes to state judiciaries over the last fifty years have
given rise to a more refined perspective on judicial independence, which
greatly influences the use of judicial power to compel funding. Modem
concepts of "judicial independence" embrace two complementary and
intertwining views on the role of courts.38 At the most basic and traditional
level, courts in America possess adjudicative independence, or the right of
individual judges, without unwarranted intrusion from the other branches,
to hear and decide cases according to the rule of law and to enforce their
decisions.'39 The term "adjudicative independence" embraces the
traditional notion of decisional independence, which is more personal and
make a non-final judgment appealable violated ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1).
134 See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. VI, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 1; MINN. CONST.
art. VI, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 1.
"' See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. § 12-102(B) (2003); Mo. REV. STAT. § 477.005,
.405 (2003). In Washington state, the legislature even controls the attire ofjudges.
See WASH. REV. CODE § 2.04.110 (2003) ("Each of the justices of the supreme
court, judges of the court of appeals, and the judges of the superior courts shall in
open court during the presentation of causes, before them, appear in and wear
gowns, made of black silk, of the usual style ofjudicial gowns.").
136 See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art. V, § 5 ("The rules shall not change substantive
rights, or the law relating to evidence, the oral examination of witnesses, juries, the
right of trial by jury, or the right of appeal.").
137 See, e.g., id. ("Any rule may be annulled or amended in whole or in part by
a law limited to the purpose."); S.D. CONST. art. V, § 12
"The Supreme Court shall have general superintending powers over all
courts and may make rules of practice and procedure and rules governing
the administration of all courts. The Supreme Court by rule shall govern
terms of courts, admission to the bar, and discipline of members of the bar.
These rules may be changed by the Legislature."
138 See, e.g., United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812); Reinhold
v. Bd. of Supervisors, 677 P.2d 1335 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
1' See Reinhold, 677 P.2d at 1339-40 (holding the right of the judiciary to be
free from interference by the other branches, and hence its inherent power, is found
in the state constitution).
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individual than it is collective and institutional.' In this context, inherent
power flows from the customary nature ofjudicial authority: the power and
obligation of judges to hear and resolve disputes.'' That a court has the
inherent power to enforce its orders is assumed because the absence of such
power would render the act of "judging" meaningless and devoid of final
effect. How a judge exercises this aspect of his or her inherent power may
be constrained by the constitution and, to a limited extent, by appropriate
legislation and judicial precedent. 42 Thejudiciary's inherent power "covers
powers thought essential to the existence, dignity, and functions of the
court because it is a court."' 43
140 Archibald Cox once described the purpose of "judicial independence" as
follows:
To my mind the idea ofjudicial independence implies: (1) that judges shall
decide lawsuits free from any outside pressure: personal, economic, or
political, including any fear of reprisal; (2) that the courts' decisions shall
be final in all cases except as changed by general, prospective legislation,
and final upon constitutional questions except as changed by constitutional
amendment; and (3) that there shall be no tampering with the organization
or jurisdiction of the courts for the purposes of controlling their decisions
upon constitutional questions.
Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purpose, 21
DAYTON L. REV. 565, 566 (1996). Cox implies that the institution of the courts is
open to tampering when its decisions rest on anything other than constitutional
principles.
4' See In re Clerk of Lyon County Courts' Compensation, 241 N.W.2d 781,
784 (Minn. 1976) ("Inherent judicial power governs that which is essential to the
existence, dignity, and function of a court because it is a court.").
42 For example, while courts possess the inherent power of contempt as a
means of enforcing orders and controlling proceedings, the specific use of that
power is, in some circumstances, controlled by legislation. See IND. CODE ANN. §
34-47-3-1 (Michie 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-501 (2003); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 476.110 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-12 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2705.01 (Anderson 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. § 22.010 (2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 567 (2003); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 21.002 (Vernon 2004).
143 FELIX F. STUMPF, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS, SWORD AND SHIELD
OF THE JUDICIARY 3 (1994). See also In re Integration of the Nebraska Bar Ass'n,
275 N.W. 265, 267 (Neb. 1937) ("The term 'inherent powers of the judiciary'
means that which is essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the court
from the very fact that it is a court."); In re Alamance County Court Facilities, 405
S.E.2d 125, 129 (N.C. 1991) ("[A] court's inherent power is its 'authority to do all
things that are reasonably necessary for the proper administration of justice.'"
(quoting Beard v. State Bar, 357 S.E.2d 694, 696 (N.D. 1987))); Winters v. City
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This aspect of inherent power is generally litigation-oriented because
it involves the judiciary's traditional and most publicly recognized
responsibility: to hear and resolve disputes and to enforce its decision.' As
noted in Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. Ninth Judicial District Court, "[t]here is
also an inherent power that is described as necessary to the efficient
functioning and prompt and just disposition of litigation and business of the
court." 45 Examples of this inherent power include, inter alia, controlling
courtroom behavior, 14 ensuring that a court has adequate facilities for
conducting court, 47 hiring sufficient personnel to carry out the business of
the court,"' managing dockets,'49 controlling discovery,"O appointing and
of Oklahoma City, 740 P.2d 724, 728 n.1 (Okla. 1987) (Opala, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)
"State courts claim as 'inherent in them' those powers which, though
neither granted to, nor withheld from, them by the state constitution and not
found in any other source of law, must nonetheless be conceded to the
judiciary as a separate department of government because their existence is
deemed absolutely essential for the performance of the court's constitution-
ally mandated mission."
14' See Alamance, 405 S.E.2d at 129 ("Typically, however, the exercise of
inherent power by the courts of this state has been limited to matters discreetly
within the judicial branch.").
145 Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. Ninth Judicial Dist. Court, 735 P.2d 709, 714 (Wyo.
1987).
' See, e.g., State v. Mains, 669 P.2d 1112, 1122 (Ore. 1983) (holding that
judges have the inherent power to run a "tight ship" in the courtroom to avoid
verbal abuses, expedite jury selection, prevent harassment, restrict argument, and
punish unacceptable conduct).
"' See, e.g., Chief Judge v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 401 So. 2d 1330, 1331
(Fla. 1981) (courts have inherent authority to acquire suitable courthouse space and
control that space, so long as reasonably necessary); Alamance, 405 S.E.2d at 132
(in principle, courts have inherent power to compel the construction of adequate
and appropriate facilities for holding court).
48 See, e.g., Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 172 N.W.2d 436, 441
(Mich. 1969).
14 See, e.g., Thomas v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 858 P.2d 113 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1993) (statute requiring court to hold hearing within 30 days violates
separation of powers since court alone has inherent power to determine when to
hear and decide cases).
"o See, e.g., In re Superior Court Order Dated April 8, 1983, 338 S.E.2d 307
(N.C. 1986) (court has inherent authority to order discovery in furtherance of a
criminal investigation); State ex rel. Lichtor v. Clark, 845 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992) (court possesses broad authority to engage in discovery management).
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paying for court experts,' and compelling payment of witness fees.'5 2 The
judiciary's inherent authority is required to effectuate the wide range of
activities constitutionally demanded for the prompt and effective
disposition of litigation and the practical administration of justice.'53
Second, and more unique to the American judiciary, courts possess a
"constitutional independence" that embraces a still-developing concept of
broad institutional independence parallel to, but beyond, the scope of an
individual judge's more limited adjudicatory independence.'54 This is an
independence that flows to the courts directly from the constitutional
structure of the government; it is institutional and anchored in the
separation-of-powers doctrine. It does not involve an individual judge's
adjudicatory independence but rather the ability of the third branch to fulfill
its separate constitutional functions, particularly its "checking" function on
the actions of the other branches through judicial review. Whereas
adjudicative independence is arguably limited in scope to those matters
involved in the administration of cases, the judiciary's constitutional
independence embraces the far-reaching issue of the courts' role in
governing the nation.
This aspect of judicial independence is most unique to American
government because, through its constitutional independence, the judiciary
exercises broader governing authority than any other nation's court
system. 5 The judiciary's "constitutional independence" centers on the
', See, e.g., In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992).
152 See, e.g., Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978) (court has
inherent authority to require payment of witness fees above statutory limits if
necessary to ensure compulsory process for criminal defendant).
5 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 17.
The superior court shall be open at all times, except on nonjudicial days,
for the determination of non-jury civil cases and the transaction ofbusiness.
For the determination of civil causes and matters in which a jury demand
has been entered, and for the trial of criminal causes, a trial jury shall be
drawn and summoned from the body of the county, as provided by law. The
right of jury trial as provided by this constitution shall remain
inviolate ....
Id.
'4 See, e.g., Cronin v. Sheldon, 991 P.2d 231, 238 (Ariz. 1999) ("The judicial
power is not dependent on the legislative branch. The judicial mandate, intended
to secure equal and substantial justice under the rule of law, is delegated to the
judiciary by the constitution, not the legislature.").
155 See, e.g., Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 74 (1861) (quoting
United States v. Peters, 3 (3 Dall.) 121, 126 (1795)).
The judicial power, so far as this jurisdiction of the court is concerned, is
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ability of the courts to pass on the constitutional legitimacy of government
actions as an indispensable part of the adjudicatory process. The inherent
power associated with the judiciary's constitutional independence is a
necessary element in the system of checks and balances, which ensures the
relevancy of the judiciary within that system. 156 Today, compared to their
vested by the Constitution; it would neither remain dormant, nor would it
expire, though the Legislative power had never passed a law to authorize
certain processes to assert such jurisdiction .... The judicial power is
abstract or relative; in the former character, the court, for itself, declares the
law and distributes justice; in the latter, it superintends and controls the
conduct of other tribunals by a prohibitory or mandatory interposition. This
superintending authority has been deposited in the Supreme Court by the
Federal Constitution, and it becomes a duty to exercise it upon every proper
occasion."
Id. See also Exparte Ward, 540 So. 2d 1350, 1351 (Ala. 1988) ("This Court has
the inherent authority to promulgate and implement rules binding on inferior courts
as to which we are charged with superintendence and control. This authority is
rooted in our constitution . . . ." (citation omitted)); Mongan v. Pima County
Superior Court, 715 P.2d 739, 742 (Ariz. 1986) (Feldman, J., dissenting) ("We
have both explicit constitutional power and inherent authority to supervise
procedures in the courts of this state."); State v. Lester, 38 S.W.3d 313, 316 (Ark.
2001) ("The Arkansas Constitution confers upon the courts the inherent authority
to promulgate rules of procedure."); In re Shay, 117 P. 442, 446 (Cal. 1911)
(Angellotti, J., dissenting) ("It may freely be admitted that this court and the other
courts which are established by the constitution have the inherent authority, under
the constitution and independent of statute, to prevent interference with the
exercise of the powers confided to them, and the enforcement of their orders,
judgments, and decrees, and that such authority cannot be taken away or
unreasonably restricted by the legislature."); State v. Barrett, 534 A.2d 219, 223
(Conn. 1987) ("[T]his court has the inherent authority to interpret the state
constitution in the context of specific cases."); Fulton County v. Woodside, 149
S.E.2d 140, 146 (Ga. 1966) ("[T]he constitution has vested all the judicial power
in the courts of the State, and.., neither the Legislature nor ajudge, nor the judges
of a superior court have authority to limit or expand the jurisdiction and authority
of a superior court."); State v. Monfort, 723 N.E.2d 407, 411 (Ind. 2000) ("[I]t has
been held in a variety of contexts that the legislature cannot interfere with the
discharge ofjudicial duties, or attempt to control judicial functions, or otherwise
dictate how the judiciary conducts its order of business.").
156 As observed in Cohen v. State, 720 N.E.2d 850, 854 (N.Y. 1999) (citation
omitted): "The courts are vested with a unique role and review power over the
constitutionality of legislation which includes being the final arbiter of true
separation of powers disputes."
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adjudicatory independence, the courts' constitutional (and therefore
institutional) independence is increasingly important and should determine
whether intrusions by the coordinate branches into the judiciary, monetary
or otherwise, are permissible.
At the state level, the evolving institutional independence of the courts
is evidenced in the language of many judicial articles. Unlike the federal
Constitution in which matters such as pay, jurisdiction, and removal from
office are purely a function of Congress, state constitutions now generally
deprive legislatures of these tools to control state courts."7 The revision of
judicial articles over the last fifty years illustrates the shift from relying on
the legislature for the institutional structure and authority of courts, towards
anchoring such matters directly in the constitution and the body of the
judiciary itself.'58 For example, in several states, legislatures no longer
control such critical matters as creating trial courts,'59 establishing
jurisdiction and venue, 60 controlling the selection and removal ofjudges, 6'
157 For example, in most states the creation of trial courts and the definition of
their jurisdiction flow directly from the constitution, not from any act of the
legislature. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 3; ARiz. CONST. art. VI, § 14; ARK.
CONST. art. VII, § 11; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10; COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 9; MINN.
CONST. art. VI, § 3; UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 5. But see KAN. CONST. art. III, §
6(b) ("The district courts shall have such jurisdiction in their respective districts as
may be provided by law."); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 31 ("The jurisdiction of
geographical and functional divisions shall be as provided by law or by judicial
rules not inconsistent with law. The courts of this state may exercise equity
jurisdiction as well as law jurisdiction in civil proceedings as may be provided by
law or by judicial rules not inconsistent with law."). As for tenure in office, the
Arizona Constitution, like many states, provides that, "No change made by the
legislature in the number ofjustices or judges shall work the removal of any justice
or judge from office. The salary of any justice or judge shall not be reduced during
the term of office for which he was elected or appointed." ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, §
33.
1'8 State constitutions have limited the legislative branch in many other
significant ways. For example, Missouri's constitution contains a healthy list of
limits on the power of the General Assembly, many of which serve to restrain the
General Assembly's spending powers and its ability to increase taxes absent a
constitutional amendment. See Mo. CONST. art. III, § 36.
"' Compare ARIZ. CONST. art. VI (2003) (allowing courts to be established as
provided "by law"), with ME. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (2003) (vesting legislature with
authority to establish inferior courts). Arizona may leave room for the judiciary
itself to create trial courts.
160 In many states criminal venue is established by the constitution, not
necessarily legislative enactment. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; MO. CONST. art.
I, § 18(a). Likewise, jurisdiction of both trial and appellate courts is a function of
the constitution, not legislation. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 6.04-.06; Mo.
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or even setting salaries. 162 Arguably over the last half-century the power of
the legislature to control the fundamental structure of courts has greatly
diminished while the influence of the institution of the judiciary has grown
significantly, both in state constitutions and in public perception. Although
state legislatures continue to be a very powerful influence, in reality the
budget has now become their greatest weapon in disputes with the
judiciary; constitutional changes have reduced or eliminated the power of
other intrusive tactics.
The distinction between a judge's individual adjudicatory
independence and the judiciary's institutional independence may seem
arcane, academic, concocted, or even irrelevant--an attempt to categorize,
rationalize, and reconcile actions of courts that have no seeming basis in
statutory or case law. Yet the distinction is important and growing more
so . 63 A judge's adjudicatory independence includes that inherent power
necessary to manage and control the administration of justice. With this
form of independence, the judiciary's inherent power is a sword to compel
litigants-including government litigants--to take actions or refrain from
taking actions that are inconsistent with court decisions. The judiciary's
institutional independence, however, embraces far more basic principles of
governance in the United States, extending to the structure of government,
its philosophical basis, and the authority and resources necessary for the
judiciary to defend itself against dangerous incursions by the political
CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 14.
161 Many states have created a judicial discipline or qualification commission
to oversee the selection and removal of judges. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 6.1, §
4(A); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12; MO. CONST. art. V, § 24. Particularly regarding
judicial discipline, several state constitutions have been amended to provide that
the state supreme court is responsible for the removal of a judge for cause.
Compare GA. CONST. of 1868, art. V, § 9 (providing for removal by governor),
with GA. CONST. art. VI, § § 7, 97 (vesting power to remove judges in a Judicial
Qualifications Commission consisting of two judges, three bar members, and two
citizens.
162 See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. XIII, § 3. This provision vests the setting of
certain salaries, including those of judges, in a citizens' commission. Under its
terms, the legislature can accept or reject the recommendations of the commission
but not alter its recommendations. See Weinstock v. Holden, 995 S.W.2d 411,414
(Mo. 1999).
163 One court has held that inherent powers are not "adjudicatory" in nature but
"non-adjudicatory. It does not deal with justiciable matters. It relates to the
administration of the business of the Court." Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne
County, 172 N.W.2d 436,440 (Mich. 1969). Yet with rare exception, the exercise
of inherent powers has been more directly related to the adjudicatory needs of
judges than to any other factor.
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branches, incursions that would otherwise undermine the system of checks
and balances.164 Under this broader model of independence, the judiciary's
inherent powers are a shield by which it can defend a distinct and separate
institution involved in the nation's governing process and thus may include
the power to compel needed resources. Accordingly, in the budget context,
the judiciary's institutional independence becomes a critical point of
departure from traditional notions of adjudicatory independence because
the legislature may legitimately control some aspects of the judicial
administration and those matters touching upon the process of
adjudication.165 The legislature cannot, however, control the institutional
purpose and standing of the courts without endangering the very premise
of the government's structure--a careful division and balancing of
fundamental powers. The matter has become more complex in recent years
as the institution of the judiciary has grown to include a broad range of
critical services and programs that support and enforce the act of
judgment.166 Consequently, preserving institutional independence may be
the most important consideration in managing a budgetary relationship with
a state legislature.
IH. CONSIDERATIONS IN COMPELLING FUNDING AT THE STATE LEVEL
The last fifty years have witnessed not only the development of modern
state judicial institutions, but also a movement away from local funding of
6 4 See Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (Penn. 1971)
(holding that judiciary as a co-equal branch of government possesses powers co-
equal with its functions, including the power to defend itself from the attack of the
political branches).
65 See First Justice of the Bristol Div. of Juvenile Court Dep't v. Clerk-
Magistrate of the Bristol Div. of Juvenile Court Dep't, 780 N.E.2d 908 (Mass.
2003) (holding that although legislature is constitutionally forbidden from
exercising judicial power, that prohibition runs only to the core function of the
judiciary and does not prohibit the legislature from controlling certain court
personnel procedures); see also McCulloch v. Glendening, 701 A.2d 99 (Md.
1997) (holding that provision authorizing governor to enter into collective
bargaining negotiations on behalf of all state employees, including court
employees, did not violate separation of powers). But see Passaic County Probation
Officers' Ass'n v. County of Passaic, 374 A.2d 449 (N.J. 1977) (finding that state
constitution mandates giving supreme court authority to prescribe rules governing
court administration transcends any legislative enactments governing public
employees who are an integral part of the court system).
'66 For example, in many states, function ofjuvenile probation is placed under
the authority of the courts and is not a function of an executive agency. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 12-5A-7 (2003). In other states, both adult and juvenile probation is
a function of the judiciary. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-251 (2003).
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courts-particularly trial courts-toward a system in which the state funds
a significant part, if not all, of court operating budgets. California is the
most recent example of this funding shift, but certainly not the first or only
example. 167 State legislatures have watched the judiciary's budget grow
significantly while state financial resources have simultaneously
dwindled. 168 In reality, the cost of operating the courts has probably not
grown any faster than the costs of operating the rest of state government,
once one factors in the increased responsibilities that legislatures have
given the courts. Rather, in many cases, the costs have simply shifted from
local to state funding. 69 Nevertheless, there exists the perception that the
judiciary's budget has become a much larger portion of state expenditures
and, therefore, a larger target in tough financial times or when courts buck
prevailing political trends on an issue.
A. Limitations on the Legislature
Courts have long recognized that state legislatures possess very broad
powers to appropriate money and place conditions and limits on the
expenditure of public funds. 70 Consequently, in monetary disputes, courts
167 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 77003 (West 2003). Other examples of states bearing
a substantial cost ofjudicial operations include Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
3-106 (2003)), Iowa (IOWACODEANN. § 602.1301 (West 2003)), Maine (ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 24 (West 2003)), New York (N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 29), North
Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-300 (2003)), Oregon (ORE. REV. STAT. § 1.002
(2003)), and South Dakota (S.D. CONST. art. V, § 11).
168 In truth, budgets of various state judiciaries have grown remarkably over the
last twenty years, but only in terms of real dollars spent, not necessarily in terms
of the percentage of state budget spent on the judiciary. A significant reason for the
growth, as noted earlier, has been the shift to state funding and away from county
and local funding. However, it would be misleading to conclude that state judiciary
budgets are growing out of control. For example, in fiscal year 2004 the state of
Missouri will spend less on the judiciary as a percentage of both overall and
general revenue state spending than it did in fiscal year 1984. MO. OFFICE OF STATE
COURTS ADM'R, PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN HISTORICAL FUNDING, STATE AND
JUDICIARY (2003).
69 For example, effective July 1, 1999, Missouri state government agreed to
absorb the costs of all juvenile officers in the state's multi-county circuits. See MO.
REV. STAT. § 211.393 (2003). This action in effect shifted the costs of operating
a large part of the state's juvenile probation system from the counties to the state.
"70 See, e.g., Etowah County Comm'n v. Hayes, 569 So. 2d 397, 399 (Ala.
1990) ("In testing the absolutism of the authority of the legislative branch to
appropriate operational funds for the executive branch, the judicial branch ...
[cannot] substitute its judgment for that of the legislature and thus usurp the
plenary power of that branch."); State v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 736 P.2d 1140
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have historically deferred to a legislature's appropriation decisions, going
so far as to hold that even the legislature itself cannot delegate critical
spending matters to another branch of government. 7 ' There are certain
powers so fundamental to the purposes and functions of a branch of
government that they cannot be delegated, even if that branch desires to do
so. Indeed, the power of appropriations is one of the most fundamental
powers of the legislature and clearly its most potent weapon against the
other branches.
Yet, every power that a branch of government enjoys--whether
explicit, implicit, or inherent-is unquestionably constrained by the
separation of powers doctrine. No branch of government, consistent with
this most fundamental constitutional principle, can exercise its assigned
power in such a manner as to undermine, subjugate, or destroy a coordinate
branch of government. The legislature's plenary power of appropriation,
therefore, is a contradiction in terms; it may be extraordinarily broad but it
(Alaska 1987) (statute purportedly giving governor sweeping power to reduce
budget without any legislative guidance is unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power); Cal. State Employees' Ass'n v. State, 32 Cal. App. 3d 103 (1973) (the
power of appropriation resides exclusively in the legislature); Chiles v. Children
A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1991) (legislative power and responsibil-
ity to set fiscal priorities through appropriations is abandoned when the power to
reduce, nullify, or change those priorities is given to the total discretion of another
branch of government); Davis v. Moon, 289 P.2d 614 (Idaho 1955) (the power of
the legislature as to the creation of indebtedness, or the expenditure of state funds,
or making appropriations, is plenary, except as limited by the state constitution);
City of Camden v. Byrne, 411 A.2d 462 (N.J. 1980) (governor has significant role
in state budgeting process although the power to expend and appropriate monies
from the state treasury is reserved exclusively to the legislature); State ex rel.
Schwartz v. Johnson, 907 P.2d 1001, 1002 (N.M. 1995) (absent proper delegation
of authority from legislature, "executive branch is precluded from exercising any
control over the expenditure of appropriated money in a manner that would affect
the legislature's choice of purpose"); Saxton v. Carey, 378 N.E.2d 95 (N.Y. 1978)
(degree of budget itemization is a matter calling for the exercise ofjudgment and
discretion by the Governor and Legislature in implementing the budgetary process
and is beyond the courts' power of review); Dist. Judges of the 188th Judicial Dist.
v. County Judge, 657 S.W.2d 908, 909-10 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
... For example, in General Assembly v. Lamm, 738 P.2d 1156 (Colo. 1987),
the Colorado Supreme Court held that the Governor could not transfer funds
between executive departments, even though authorized to do so by statute,
because the statute creating such power violated the legislature's plenary power
over appropriations.
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is not unlimited, even in the absence of any precise limitations. 7 2 As for the
judiciary, courts exist by constitutional design, not through legislative or
executive grace. While subject to legislative authority in many contexts,
courts are not subservient to the legislature. The legislature cannot use its
appropriation authority to impede the judiciary from exercising the powers
assigned to it any more than the legislature can use its appropriation
authority to eliminate the office of governor or so impede the exercise of
gubernatorial power through misappropriation as to render the executive
branch impotent in its relationship with the legislature. 73 Stated simply, a
state legislature cannot appropriate another branch of government out of
business.
Several courts have observed, however, that the judiciary must be
exceedingly careful in using its inherent powers, lest it be accused of
172 See, e.g., Moore v. Love, 107 S.W.2d 982,983 (Tenn. 1936) ("[T]he power
of the legislative over the judicial branch of the government must conform to the
limitations expressed in the Constitution. It should be noted that the Constitution
does not reserve to the Legislature all right to deal with any other branch of the
government with certain exceptions, but there is an express prohibition of any
branch of the government exercising any power properly belonging to another
branch except in the cases expressly directed or permitted by the Constitution
itself."); Dist. Judges of the 188th Judicial Dist., 657 S.W.2d at 909 ("For this
separation of powers principle to operate effectively as intended, there must be a
reasonable and proper exercise of power by each branch and a harmonious
cooperation among the three. The judiciary is especially vulnerable to a breakdown
of this cooperation, because it depends entirely upon the legislative and executive
branches for its funding and for the practical enforcement of its decrees, and it has
little effective recourse when those branches are derelict in their duties toward it.
When, therefore, the necessary spirit of cooperation fails the judiciary must resort
to its inherent power to insure that it will have the means to discharge its responsi-
bilities.").
"' See State ex rel. Hovey v. Noble, 21 N.E. 244, 247 (Ind. 1889)
"[I]n America, a Legislature is a Legislature and nothing more. The same
instrument which creates it creates also the executive, Governor and the
judges. They hold by a title as good as its own. If the Legislature should
pass a law depriving the Governor of an executive function conferred by the
Constitution, that law would be void. If the Legislature attempted to
interfere with the jurisdiction of the courts, their action would be even more
palpably illegal and ineffectual.";
Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 199 (Pa. 1971) ("Unless the
legislature can be compelled by the courts to provide the money which is
reasonably necessary for the proper administration of the Courts, our entire Judicial
system could be extirpated, and by the Legislature could make a mockery of our
form of Government .... ).
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invading the province of the legislature and thereby risk undermining
public support.174 While the legislature cannot abolish a constitutionally
created court, either explicitly or by withholding the funds necessary for its
operations,' 75 the judiciary cannot ignore the legislature's broad power to
appropriate resources, its authority to make decisions associated with the
allocation of limited public dollars, or its political standing with the
electorate.176 The question, therefore, is not whether the legislature has an
obligation to fund the judiciary, but rather at what constitutionally
appropriate level. 77
B. Application of Inherent Powers to Funding Disputes
Funding disputes between courts and legislative bodies are not new.
Although exceedingly rare, courts as far back as 1838 exercised inherent
power to compel the expenditure of funds for judicial operations related to
the determination of cases. 178 In 1838, for example, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held in Commissioners v. Hall that a court could compel the
county commission to pay the public accommodations for a sequestered
jury, finding that "[w]hen a deficiency of public accommodation induces
an expenditure, it must be at the public charge, for it is as much a part of
' See, e.g., In re Salary of the Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d 163, 170 (Wash. 1976)
(noting that checks by one branch must not "undermine the operation of another
branch").
115 See Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 190 N.W.2d 228, 231 (Mich.
1971).
176 See Reinhold v. Bd. of Supervisors, 677 P.2d 1335, 1340 (Ariz. 1984).
177 One interesting question that such a funding dispute would present is how
a legal action to enforce a state court funding demand would proceed. Who would
be the proper party and subject of any court order? It is unlikely that a court would
order the state legislature to appropriate needed funds. Such an approach would
set-up a confrontation of constitutional proportions by subjecting the legislature to
the contempt power of the courts. Moreover, it is unlikely that a state legislature
would gladly accept a court order. Thus, a more plausible scenario is that the state
courts would continue to spend money notwithstanding appropriation limits. Once
the appropriation limits were exceeded, the court would order the state treasurer to
continue paying the judiciary's bills. The state treasurer would be subjected to the
contempt powers of the court even though the continued payment of bills without
appropriation authority may itself cause the treasurer to violate the law. Neverthe-
less, this approach would avoid a direct confrontation with the Legislature.
178 Comm'rs v. Hall, 7 Watts 290 (Pa. 1838).
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the contingent expenses of the court, as is the price of the fire wood and
candles consumed in the courtroom."
' 179
Such disputes have erupted in the past and most assuredly will erupt
with greater frequency in the future, particularly as judicial budgets grow
at a time when state resources are dwindling. There is no consensus on how
to handle funding disputes. Although courts universally champion the
proposition that the judiciary possesses the inherent power to compel
needed funding, courts are hardly consistent in the application of this
principle. Case law indicates that most state courts, particularly those at the
appellate level, only reluctantly approve the use of inherent power to
compel funding. '80
In recent years the number and intensity of court funding disputes has
seemingly increased, forced by the dramatic increase in state judiciaries'
costs, their responsibilities, their exploding caseloads, and the reach of their
decisions. Unlike early funding disputes, today's disputes center more on
the institutional needs of the judiciary than on the resources needed to
resolve a particular case. In response to these budget disputes, courts have
tried a panoply of remedies, including the use of ex parte orders' 8' and writs
of mandamus'82 to command a legislative body to pay the expenses of a
court. Yet even with the increase in the number and intensity of funding
disputes, it is difficult to identify a single legal approach as the standard for
settling such disputes. Despite the lack of agreement on the legal principles,
several generalizations can be gleaned from the case law. A word of
caution, however, is needed. Notwithstanding the growth in state support
"' Id. at 291; State ex rel. Hovey v. Noble, 21 N.E. 244 (Ind. 1889); County
Conm'rs of Allegany County v. County Comm'rs of Howard County, 57 Md. 393
(1882) (holding that county in which cases originated is required to pay all cost
related to the jury); Stowell v. Bd. of Supervisors for Jackson County, 23 N.W.
557, 558 (Mich. 1885) ("[I]n criminal cases the power of the court to keep [jurors]
in custody, and to bind the county to pay for their maintenance, is established by
several cases, and is believed to have been done without dispute heretofore in this
State."); Carpenter v. County of Dane, 9 Wis. 274 (1859) (holding that in
meritorious cases, court has obligation to appoint counsel and county has obligation
to pay). But cf. Kelley v. Andrew County, 43 Mo. 338 (1869) (holding that counsel
appointed to represent the indigent are not employees of the county and thus cannot
demand compensation from the county). For a more general discussion on the
power of courts to compel funding for judicial purposes, see Gary D. Spivey,
Annotation, Inherent Power of Court to Compel Appropriation or Expenditure of
Funds for Judicial Purposes, 59 A.L.R.3d 569 (1974).
,80 See discussion infra at pp. 1038-39.
,8, See O'Coins, Inc. v. Treasurer of County, 287 N.E.2d 608 (Mass. 1972).
182 See State ex rel. Wilke v. Hamilton County Bd. of Comm'rs, 734 N.E.2d 811
(Ohio 2000); Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1971).
2003-2004] 1033
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
for the courts, many court-funding disputes continue to revolve around state
courts' compelling units of local government (generally counties or
municipalities) to fund trial court operations, often as required by state
law. 83 Such disputes are not strictly inherent power disputes.'84 The
underlying court action to compel expenditures usually has some
imprimatur of statutory or constitutional authority.'85 Moreover, counties
and municipalities, as political subdivisions of the state, do not enjoy
constitutional or pragmatic equality with state courts, which exercise the
sovereign authority of the state."'
These local funding dispute cases provide important insight into some
general principles concerning the use of inherent powers to compel
funding. Unfortunately, they do not recognize the complexity of the
interbranch relationships at the state level or the particularly thorny
political relationships involved in interbranch matters. These cases thus
prove useful but hardly conclusive in resolving the very prickly issue of
compelling state funding in disputes between equal branches. Moreover, it
is questionable, absent exceedingly extraordinary circumstances, whether
a state court could compel a state legislature to exercise its legislative
183 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-12-15 (2003); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-130 (2003);
FLA. STAT. ch. 29.008 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-6-24 (2003); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 476.270 (2003); OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 307.01 (West 2003); TEX. Gov'TCODE
ANN. § 24.954 (Vernon 2003).
'"See McDonald v. Campbell, 821 P.2d 139, 144 (Ariz. 1991) (Holohan, C.J.,
concurring).
181 See, e.g., Beckert v. Warren; 439 A.2d 638, 645 (Pa. 1981) (citing 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 2302); Gallatin County ex rel. County Comm'rs v. Mont. Eighteenth
Judicial Dist. Court, 930 P.2d 680 (Mont. 1997) (citing MONT. CODE. ANN. § 3-5-
404); see also MO. REV. STAT. §§ 50.640-642 (2003) (delineating mechanisms for
county funding of the circuit courts).
1
8 6 See Pennington County v. S.D. Unified Judicial Sys., 641 N.W.2d 127, 130,
132 (S.D. 2002) ("The states have created local government entities such as
counties, townships and cities to do the states' work at the local level. These
subordinate arms of the State have only that authority specifically given by the state
legislature.... Counties are merely subdivisions of the state created by the state to
conveniently carry out the state's governmental functions as the state's agents. As
agents, counties cannot contest the actions of their principal, the state."). At least
one state has attempted to resolve local court funding matters through means other
than the traditional judicial process. Missouri has implemented a Judicial Finance
Commission comprised ofjudges and county commissioners, which sits in review
of court funding disputes and issue findings and conclusions. See Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 477.600 (2003). An appeal may then be taken to the state supreme court. The
intent of the commission, however, is to mediate funding disputes short of formal
judicial intervention.
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powers to appropriate monies for judicial operations without violating the
separation of powers doctrine.187 The only case directly relevant to this
issue is Wachtler v. Cuomo.' This case involved a dispute between then
Chief Judge Wachtler of the New York Court of Appeals and Governor
Mario Cuomo over the latter's decision to cut the judiciary's budget
request. The case marks one of the first substantial uses of the doctrine of
inherent powers against a coequal branch of government.'89 The case was
settled and therefore provided no final judicial determination to aid in
analyzing the application of constitutional law standards to similar disputes.
The first proposition to emerge from the case law is this: courts
universally agree that the judiciary possesses inherent power as a function
of being a separate branch of government and that this power extends to
... Virtually all state constitutions place appropriation authority strictly in the
state legislature. See, e.g., ARIz. CONST. art. 4.2, § 20; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 32;
FLA. CONST. art. III, §§ 12, 19; MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 18. Thus, one possible
scenario for compelling funding of state court operations would be for the judiciary
to bypass the legislature and go directly to the state treasury. Practically speaking,
it would be difficult to foresee how a state court-even a state supreme
court-could enforce a legal action compelling the state legislature to adopt a
certain budget for the judiciary. To do so would arguably place appropriation
authority and responsibility in the judiciary, a blatant invasion of legislative power
by the courts and violation of the separation of powers doctrine. As noted earlier,
see supra note 177, the most likely means of compelling funding would be a direct
confrontation of the courts with the state treasurer. The judiciary would spend its
budget and then order the state treasurer to continue to cover its expenses even in
the absence of an appropriation. This scenario may have its own difficulties, in that
several states require appropriation for all expenditures from the state treasury. See,
e.g., MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 1 ("No money shall be paid out of the treasury of this
state except in pursuance of an appropriation by law."); WIS. CONST. art. VIII, §
2 ("No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation by law."). But see generally Kan. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 02-17 (Mar. 26,
2002), discussed infra at note 196.
"' Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 6034/91 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cty. filed Sept. 27,
1991).
1
89 See Howard B. Glaser, Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits of Inherent Power,
14 PACE L. REV. 111 (1994). A similar case arose in Connecticut regarding
whether state funding of the judiciary was adequate and whether the lack of
funding was hampering the adjudication of litigants' rights. While affirming the
principle of inherent judicial powers, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed a




compelling necessary funding.19° As noted in In reAlamance County Court
Facilities, a court's inherent power inheres in its status as one of the three
separate, coordinate branches of the government: "For over a century this
Court has recognized such powers as being plenary within the judicial
branch--neither limited by our constitution nor subject to abridgement by
the legislature."'' 91 Many state courts have espoused this principle and
embraced it as a justification for compelling funding for needed
operations.'92 Rather than limiting a court's inherent power, the constitution
and design of government actually promote and protect that power.' 9'
Second, the inaction of a legislative body may itself justify the use of
inherent powers to compel funding. For example, in Beard v. North
Carolina State Bar, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that its order
establishing a Client Security Fund was a constitutional exercise of inherent
power, which did not rest upon any required action by the legislature.' 94
That same court relied upon the Beard decision when it ruled in In re
Alamance County Facilities, that "when inaction by those exercising
legislative authority threatens fiscally to undermine the integrity of the
judiciary, a court may invoke its inherent power to do what is reasonably
necessary."' 95 A court, therefore, need not have affirmative denial of a
'90 See Morgan County Comm'n v. Powell, 293 So. 2d 830 (Ala. 1974); Sholes
v. Sholes, 760 N.E.2d 156, 164 (Ind. 2001), superseded by statute as stated in Sims
v. Ivens, 774 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361
So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978); Becker v. Barthelemy, 495 So. 2d 1316 (La. 1986); State
ex rel. Farley v. Spaulding, 507 S.E.2d 376 (W. Va. 1998).
'9' In re Alamance County Court Facilities, 405 S.E.2d 125, 129 (N.C. 1991).
192 See, e.g., O'Coins, Inc. v. Treasurer of County, 287 N.E.2d 608 (Mass.
1972) (holding that, even apart from statutory provisions, judge may bind county
and order payment for essential services despite absence of prior appropriation to
cover the expenses).
1 See Beard v. N.C. State Bar, 357 S.E.2d 694, 695 (N.C. 1987).
'
94 Id. ("The inherent power of the Court has not been limited by our constitu-
tion. To the contrary, the constitution protects such power. The General Assembly
has no authority to deprive the judicial department 'of any power or jurisdiction
that rightfully pertains to it as a co-ordinate department of the government ....
(quoting N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 1)).
9 Alamance, 405 S.E.2d at 131; see also In re Order on Prosecution of
Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1133 (Fla. 1990) (citing Rose v. Palm Beach
County, 361 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 1978))
"The doctrine of inherent judicial power as it relates to the practice of
compelling the expenditure of funds by the executive and legislative
branches of government has developed as a way of responding to inaction
or inadequate action that amounts to a threat to the courts' ability to make
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request for funding; silence is sufficient to justify the exercise of inherent
power to compel funding for reasonably necessary expenditures.' 96 .
Third, the use of inherent power to compel funding is subject to the
requirement that courts may use the power to compel only what is
reasonably necessary for the administration of justice. 19 7 Of course, what
is reasonably necessary is subject to wide interpretation and artful
characterization.1 8 Historically, most judicial funding disputes arise
between local courts and local legislative bodies, generally over resources
effective their jurisdiction.";
cf N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. State, 192 Misc. 2d 424, 436 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2002) ("Accordingly, when legislative appropriations prove insufficient and
legislative inaction obstructs thejudiciary's ability to function, the judiciary has the
inherent authority to bring the deficient state statute into compliance with the
Constitution by order of a mandatory preliminary injunction.").
196 Rather than compelling funding, the Kansas Supreme Court exercised its
inherent power to impose a series of emergency surcharges remedying a $3.5
million reduction of the judiciary's budget. See Kansas Judicial Branch Fiscal Year
2003 Emergency Surcharge, 2002 SC 13 (Mar. 22, 2002). Not only did the
supreme court order the application of the surcharges, but it also directed the state
treasurer to create a special fund within the treasury and to deposit receipts of all
emergency surcharges in that fund for the exclusive use of the judicial branch. For
a more thorough legal analysis of the action, see Kan. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 02-17
(Mar. 26, 2002). The Kansas Attorney General opined, in part:
The authority of the Kansas Supreme Court, through the Chief Justice,
to impose a surcharge on court costs arises from the Kansas Constitution
and various Kansas statutes, all read in light of the inherent authority
possessed by the Supreme Court to take such action as is necessary to
maintain its independence as a co-equal branch of government and insure
that it is adequately funded to perform its mandated functions. Before this
power may be exercised, in order that legislative and executive branch
authority is properly considered, the Court must make a finding that
peculiar circumstances exist requiring such an extraordinary measure.
Id. at4.
19' See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Nineteenth Judicial Dist., 895 P.2d 545
(Colo. 1995); Smith v. Miller, 384 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1963); In re DeKalb County
Courthouse Fire Sprinkler Sys., 454 S.E.2d 126 (Ga. 1995); see also Becker v.
Barthelemy, 495 So. 2d 1316 (La. 1986) (holding that a court asserting inherent
powers must demonstrate that its objective is reasonably necessary to a judicial
function (Dennis, J., dissenting)); Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d
193, 199 (Pa. 1971) ("The court does not have unlimited power to obtain from the
City whatever sums it would like or believe it needs for its proper functioning or
adequate administration. Its wants and needs must be proved by it to be 'reasonably
necessary' for its proper functioning and administration .. ").
198 For a general discussion on the use of inherent powers to compel reasonably
necessary expenses, see Spivey, supra note 179.
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that are needed for a court to fulfill its adjudicative responsibilities. For
example, in State ex rel. Wilke v. Hamilton County Board of
Commissioners,199 a state judge ordered a county commission to fund a
probate court. When the commission refused, the judge sought and obtained
a writ of mandamus. The Ohio Supreme Court, issuing the writ, held,
"Common pleas courts and their divisions possess inherent authority to
order funding that is reasonable and necessary to the court's administration
of its business."'20
Fourth, in determining what is reasonably necessary, appellate courts
have generally been reluctant to sanction the use of inherent power except
upon some proof by the court that the funds sought directly related to the
clear administration of justice."' One court has held that there must be a
direct nexus between the funding request and the resulting impairment to
the operations of the courts. 22 At the core of the reluctance toward a more
elastic definition is the fear that,just as the judiciary opposes encroachment
upon its authority, so too courts must resist the temptation to encroach upon
legislative authority, particularly budgetary authority.20 3 Courts must
'99 State ex rel. Wilke v. Hamilton County Bd. of Comm'rs, 734 N.E.2d 811
(Ohio 2000); accord State ex rel. Dellick v. Sherlock, 796 N.E.2d 897 (Ohio
2003); Birdsall v. Pima County, 475 P.2d 250 (Ariz. 1970) (en banc).
200 Wilke, 734 N.E.2d at 818 (emphasis added).
201 See Beckert v. Warren, 439 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1981).
202 See id. at 647
"Where the preconditions to the exercise by the judiciary of its inherent
power are otherwise present, it becomes necessary to focus on the nexus
between the funding sought and the resulting impairment to judicial
administration.... [A]n expenditure which is 'reasonably necessary' for
constitutional purposes is one absent which the judiciary will be unable 'to
carry out its mandated responsibilities, and its powers and duties to
administer Justice.'"
Virtually all courts have held that the standard for compelling funding is whether
the proposed expenditure is reasonably necessary to the judiciary's fulfilling its
constitutional duties. Few courts have ventured to provide a definition of
"reasonably necessary." Notwithstanding near universal acceptance of the standard,
courts differ on who has the burden of proving whether the expense is reasonably
necessary. Some courts hold that the burden rests with the judiciary, while others
hold that the legislature bears the burden of demonstrating that the funding request
is not reasonably necessary. Compare In re Salary of the Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d
163 (Wash. 1976) (finding burden rests in the judiciary), with Wilke, 734 N.E.2d
at 811 (holding that legislature bears the burden of showing expense unreasonable).
203 Pena v. Dist. Court of the Second Judicial Dist., 681 P.2d 953, 956 (Colo.
1984) (holding that the "separation of powers doctrine imposes upon the judiciary
a proscription against interfering with the executive or legislative branches as well
as a duty to perform its.., obligations with complete independence").
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respect the authority of the legislative branch to set policy through the use
of its appropriation authority, and must, unless faced with exigent
circumstances, avoid the use of inherent powers to countermand legislative
finding decisions.20 4 It is clear that even in relatively minor disputes, courts
are ambivalent about the use of inherent powers to compel funding. As the
Washington Supreme Court noted:
By its nature, litigation based on inherent judicial power to finance
its own functions ignores the political allocation of available monetary
resources by representatives of the people elected in a carefully monitored
process .... The unreasoned assertion of [courts'] power to determine
and demand their [courts'] own budget is a threat to the image of and
public support for the courts. In addition, such actions may threaten,
rather than strengthen, judicial independence since involvement in the
budgetary process imposes upon the courts at least partial responsibility
for increased taxes and diminished funding for other public services.
20 5
Finally, while some courts opine that the inherent power to compel
funding also means that the court alone can determine its needs,206 other
24 Some courts have implicitly questioned the "reasonably necessary" standard
in local funding disputes, imposing a much higher burden on the court itself. In
Butte-Silver Bow Local Government v. Olsen, 743 P.2d 564,566 (Mont. 1987), the
Montana Supreme Court held, "Inherent judicial power to compel funding in
Montana should only be used when an emergency arises or when the established
methods for providing funding have failed." (citing State ex rel. Hillis v. Sullivan,
137 P. 392 (Mont. 1913)).
205 Salary of the Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d at 172-73.
206 In Wilke, 734 N.E.2d at 811, the Ohio Supreme Court struck down as
unconstitutional a statute mandating that a probate judge who disagrees with a local
body's funding decision must file a mandamus action in the court of appeals. The
Supreme Court held that the statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2101.11 (B)(2) (West
2003), unconstitutionally restricted the Supreme Court's authority to issues writs
of mandamus under its original jurisdiction. "Based on these constitutional
provisions, R.C. 2101.11 (B) is unconstitutional because it prevents a probate court
judge dissatisfied with the amount appropriated for the probate court from invoking
the original jurisdiction of this court in mandamus. Instead, it relegates an
aggrieved probate judge to a mandamus action in the court of appeals." Wilke, 734
N.E.2d at 817; accord People ex rel. Bier v. Scholz, 394 N.E.2d 1157, 1160 (I11.
1979) ("[T]he judiciary has inherent power to determine what funds are reasonably
necessary for its efficient and effective operation and the power to compel the
payment of those funds .. "); In re Court Reorganization Plan, 391 A.2d 1255,
1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)
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courts have taken a far more conservative view of the use of inherent
powers in this context.2 °7 The more conservative view subjects the use of
inherent power to certain evidentiary restrictions including the
reasonableness of the demand, the availability of funds, and whether a
legislative funding body's refusal to appropriate money actually impairs the
operations of the court.20 8 The use of inherent power to compel funds can
be viewed as antidemocratic, not only creating a potentially volatile
situation vis-t-vis the legislature, but also impugning the judiciary's
credibility in the eyes of the public. 20 9 As the Washington Supreme Court
noted, "No authority rests in the judiciary to appropriate funds. ... ,,20 The
exercise of inherent powers to compel funding must take place only under
the most egregious of circumstances, and even then only after all
reasonable efforts have been made to secure funding through traditional
channels.21 !
In summary, the case law suggests that courts universally defend the
principle of inherent power as inseparable from the independence of the
judiciary, both as an adjudicatory body and a constitutional institution of
government. Yet the case law also reveals that courts are hesitant, even
ambivalent, regarding the concept's application in the budget context.
Although courts clearly possess inherent powers, it is difficult at times to
reconcile the use of those powers with the independent powers and
prerogatives of the other branches. If courts have no appropriation authority
and recognize that such authority is clearly lodged in the legislature, on
what basis may they invoke inherent powers without simultaneously
creating a climate in which the coordinate branches use their own inherent
powers to interfere with the prerogatives of the judiciary?
"Where the question of burden of proof arises in the limited context of
designation and compensation of special assistants authorized by court rule,
and the record supports a prima facie showing of reasonableness and
necessity for the administrative action, it behooves the objecting officials
to undertake the burden of proving that the court's action is arbitrary and
unreasonable."
207 See Salary of the Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d at 163.
208 See, e.g., id. at 175.
209 Id. at 173.
2 0 Id. at 166.
211 See Butte-Silver Bow Local Gov't v. Olsen, 743 P.2d 564,566 (Mont. 1987)
("Inherent judicial power to compel funding in Montana should only be used when
an emergency arises or when the established methods for providing funding have
failed.").
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Absent specific statutory or constitutional provisions, two grounds
generally support the principle that courts may use inherent power to
compel funding. First, based upon the judiciary's adjudicatory
responsibilities, courts may compel funding when the legislature's failure
to provided needed resources restricts access to courts or reduces judicial
appropriations to the point at which courts can no longer fulfill their
constitutional obligation of deciding cases. Due process has no substantive
meaning if funding problems close courts to the public. The use of inherent
power in this context rests, in large measure, upon the judiciary's
adjudicatory independence--the court's obligation to be open and to render
expeditious and effective justice free from unwarranted interference by the
coordinate branches of government. This is the traditional foundation of
most court funding decisions. Legislatures do, however, possess
considerable authority to control the "administration ofjustice," especially
through statutory changes that eliminate the courts' legal basis for
demanding funds.2" 2
Second, and more abstract, the judiciary's constitutional independence,
grounded in the separation of powers doctrine, requires the legislature to
fund items reasonably necessary to ensure the courts' viability and
effectiveness as a governing institution. State constitutions create a series
of interdependent powers by vesting the particulars of that interdependency
in three branches of government. The constitutional structure of
government ensures that no one branch can exercise its independent powers
with finality absent the implicit or explicit consent of the other branches.
Thus, through judicial review, the courts impose a restraint on the actions
212 For example, under federal welfare reform provisions states were required
to centralize child support systems. Congress concluded that a centralized system
would provide greater expedience and efficiency in ensuring support payments
reached custodial parents. See 42 U.S.C. § 654(3) (2003). In many states, this
change resulted in the shifting of all child support payment adjudications from the
judiciary to an executive branch agency. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-33. 1(c)
(2002); Mo. REV. STAT. § 454.530 (2002). In effect, the change eliminated a
traditional function of the judiciary, thus precluding any demands for funds to
administer this aspect of the courts' business. Some courts have found aspects of
this delegation of traditional judiciary authority over family law matters to
executive branch officials unconstitutional. See Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588
N.W.2d 720,724 (Minn. 1999) (finding that "[f]amily dissolution remedies.., rely
on the district court's inherent equitable powers"); Seubert v. Seubert, 13 P.3d 365,
374 (Mont. 2000) (striking a statute granting an agency "judicial power" to enforce
child support orders). Other courts have upheld similar changes, including those
that allow administrative agencies to modify court-ordered support. See State ex
rel. Hilburn v. Staeden, 91 S.W.3d 607, 609 (Mo. 2002); Morgan County Dep't of
Human Res. v. B.W.J., 723 So. 2d 689, 693 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998).
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of the legislative and executive branches. As Alexander Hamilton observed,
"It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an
intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among
other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their
authority.
' 213
In asserting principles to justify courts' ordering additional state
funding, one must examine not only the legal basis of the assertion, but also
the principles governing the propriety of the action. The case law makes
clear that courts must be funded at a reasonably necessary level,
understanding that "reasonably necessary" is a term of art. In compelling
a state to pay additional costs, courts may be required to engage in an
intensive fact-based analysis of each item of the request, assessing whether
the courts' adjudicatory and constitutional independence will be impaired
if the funds are not provided. This analysis may be critical in vindicating
the judiciary's action to the public. What is legally justified bears political
consequence, particularly in the context of a funding crisis. It is wise,
therefore, to consider not only what is legally justified but also what is
politically feasible.1 4
C. Politics, Perception, and a Clash of Cultures: Some Final
Observations
While courts may often see themselves as the weakest of the branches
of government, others tend to view them as possessing extraordinary
power. This perception may result in part from the zero-sum nature of the
judicial process.215 While the political branches must negotiate solutions
through a consensus-building process defined by democratic principles, the
judicial process forces courts to render "final judgments," declaring
winners and losers ostensibly without the nuances of politics.2 16 Although
213 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton).
214 Cf Webster County Bd. of Supervisors v. Flattery, 268 N.W.2d 869, 877
(Iowa 1978) ("The confidence and trust of the public and the bar depend on the
efficient, competent administration ofjustice secured through adequate funding of
courts").
215 Cf Richard L. Hasen, Some High Court Modesty is in Order, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2003, at B 11 (questioning the appropriateness of the Supreme Court's
control over U.S. politics when it upheld the McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance
Reform Law).
216 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,649 (2000) ("Hence, 'conflicts
of economic interest.., are wisely left under our system to resolution by Congress
under its more flexible and responsible legislative process. Such conflicts rarely
lend themselves to judicial determination. And with the wisdom, workability, or
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individual members of thejudiciary might contest this proposition, arguing
that court decisions are decidedly an exercise of balancing interests, the
fact remains that the judicial process inevitably yields winners and losers." 7
The typical question before a judge is whether one party has a right and the
other party a duty, with the court rendering a decision supported by
predefined legal principles on disputed issues of fact or law.2t8 The judicial
fairness, of the plan of regulation we have nothing to do."' (quoting Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942))); Voices for Choices v. I11. Bell Tel. Co., 339
F.3d 542, 544-45 (7th Cir. 2003).
The legislative process is democratic, and so legislators have an entirely
legitimate interest in determining how interest groups and influential
constituents view a proposed statute.... The judicial process, in contrast,
though 'political' in a sense when judges are asked to decide cases that
conventional legal materials... leave undetermined, . . . is not democratic
in the sense of basing decision on the voting or campaign-financing power
of constituents and interest groups.
Christian Sci. Reading Room Jointly Maintained v. City of San Francisco, 807 F.2d
1466, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Nor is the equal protection clause a warrant for
eliminating the legislative practice of compromise and vote trading. Whereas
compromise and vote trading have no place in the judicial process, they are an
expected and necessary aspect of the legislative process."); Luke K. Cooperrider,
The Rule of Law and the Judicial Process, 59 MICH. L. REv. 501, 505 (1961).
217 Arguing for the democratic nature of the judicial process, Donald L.
Horowitz has observed:
The courts are more democratically accountable, through a variety of formal
and informal mechanisms, than they have been accused of being. Equally
important, the other branches are in many ways less democratically
accountable than they in turn were said to be by those who emphasized the
special disabilities under which judges labor.
HOROWITZ, supra note 25, at 18; see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders,
WILSON Q., Autumn 2003, at 27
"Claims about 'American realism' are often exaggerated, but there is
undoubtedly in the United States a greater understanding than in Europe
that all law, including judge-made law (i.e., judicial decisions), and even
judge-made constitutional law, is a political product. From an American
point of view, if the law is to be democratic, the law and the courts that
interpret it must retain strong connections to the nation's democratic
political system."
218 The judicial process is guided not only by statutes and stare decisis, but also
by such self-imposed restraints as justiciability doctrines, which generally ensure
that courts consider only narrowly defined disputes, and that they render equally
narrowly defined decisions. By contrast, the legislative process is significantly
2003-2004] 1043
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
process encourages, indeed demands, that courts resolve disputes, including
those implicating public policy, on the narrowest grounds and with a much
greater finality than the legislative process allows. By contrast, the typical
legislature or executive bureaucracy addresses broad issues of public
policy, assessing the range of alternatives available to resolve a problem.
Narrow principles of legal analysis have little value in this context. While
Americans generally look to the legislative process to protect broad public
interests (a function of negotiation and compromise), they generally look
to the judicial process to protect private interests (a function of declaration
and finality). These are starkly different ways of defining and resolving
public policy problems, and necessarily impact the internal workings and
cultures of the various branches of government.
Court decisions with broad public impact, consequently, can be seen as
undermining democratic political values,219 not to mention overarching
budgetary considerations.220 Courts themselves acknowledge the limited
value of the judicial process in resolving many broad public policy
issues.22' This fundamental difference in the processes used to resolve
more expansive, not only in what problems it confronts but also in the process for
resolving those problems.
219 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
But persuading one's fellow citizens is one thing, and imposing one's views
in absence of democratic majority will is something else.... What Texas
has chosen to do is well within the range of traditional democratic action,
and its hand should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new
"constitutional right" by a Court that is impatient of democratic change.
Id.
220 See generally HOROWITZ, supra note 25, at 256.
221 People v. Korman, 47 Misc. 2d 945, 947 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1965) ("The
judicial process through which courts alone act is a most finely finished instrument
for the solution of questions of law between litigants. But as to questions ofpolicy
the judicial process is a very limited instrument as to notice and opportunity to be
heard, or as to hearing or considering other than the two sides to the litigation,
though that policy issue may have great multiplicity of sides and interested
parties."). Roscoe Pound held a quite different position, arguing that the judicial
process, unlike the legislative process, produced public policy that came from
concrete experience, not prophecy. Pound wrote:
Judicial finding of law has a real advantage in competition with legislation
in that it works with concrete cases and generalizes only after a long course
of trial and error in the effort to work out a practicable principle. Legisla-
tion, when more than declaratory, when it does more than restate authorita-
tively what judicial experience has indicated, involves the difficulties and
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public policy issues cannot be underestimated as a source of
misunderstanding and tension between the branches--even on budget
matters.222 The idea of courts' "ordering" the expenditure of public funds
for their operations-as if they were rendering a final judgment in a
disputed case-is at odds with the give-and-take of the legislative process,
whose primary actors must balance competing and often amorphous
interests and demands in shaping public policy.
223
Moreover, in the budget context, the judiciary must recognize that the
state legislature's power over appropriations involves more than simply
bankrolling government operations. Beyond a simple allocation for
programs, a state budget is a statement of public policy. The budget is a
constitutionally protected exercise in balancing competing public demands
through the prism of national, regional, state, and local politics. From the
legislature's perspective, there is no truly right or wrong answer, no zero-
sum decision, because each exercise of the legislature's
power-particularly its budgetary power-results from different political
perspectives compelling, however inartfully, a consensus approach to
setting public policy. The bargaining process of the legislature neither
complements nor contradicts the decisional process of the courts; they are
simply two entirely different methodologies used to solve
problems--sometimes the same problem.224 The different approaches do,
however, present a challenge to judicial, legislative, and executive branch
leaders in understanding one another's cultures and working out
compromises on thejudiciary's budget. Demanding resources because they
are reasonably necessary to secure the judiciary's adjudicative and
constitutional roles may hold little persuasive value for the public or a
perils of prophecy.
ROsCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 45 (1938).
222 See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("It is also indisput-
able that in matters involving another branch of the government, the courts must
be especially wary of overstepping their proper role, for 'repeated and essentially
head-on confrontations between the life-tenured branch and the representative
branches of government will not, in the long run, be beneficial to either.'" (quoting
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974))).
223 As observed in In re Salary of the Juvenile Director, 552 P.2d 163, 173
(Wash. 1976), "The judiciary is isolated from the opinion gathering technique of
public hearings as well as removed from politically sensitive, proportionately
elected representatives."
224 Simpson v. Mun. Court, 14 Cal. App. 3d 591, 598 (1971) ("The analogy to
courthouse picketing is imperfect, because the judicial process repels the
intervention of external opinion while the legislative process stands in need of it.").
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coordinate branch, given there is scarcely an agency of government that
cannot make a similar claim with reference to its public obligations.225
It is axiomatic, therefore, that the judiciary does not possess a large
hammer in budget battles with the legislature.226 Short of invoking inherent
power, courts lie at the mercy of the legislature's goodwill and its hoped-
'for commitment to adequate funding for the justice system.227 But all must
225 Many executive departments are also constitutional and therefore may
similarly not be subject to elimination by statutory action or fiscal misappropria-
tion. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 11 & 12 (establishing Departments of Veterans
Affairs and Elderly Affairs). Unlike the federal Constitution, most state constitu-
tions provide for separately elected constitutional officers, such as attorney general,
auditor, comptroller, treasurer, and secretary of state. While these positions are
generally classified as "executive" because of the nature of their functions, they,
like state courts, exist by constitutional rather than statutory mandate. Funding cuts
that would effectively eliminate these offices would likewise appear unconstitu-
tional.
226 Most state constitutions require the judiciary to submit its budget to the
governor just as any other state body, except the legislature, would. While this may
be done for practical reasons, the effect is to create an impression that the judiciary
is not truly a coordinate branch of government; that it sits at the same level as an
executive department or independent agency. This budgeting process gives the
governor the opportunity to reduce the judiciary's budget before the legislature
begins its mark-up. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1664 (West 2003)
(permitting the governor to modify the budget request prepared by the judiciary
before submitting it to the legislature). Even in those states where the governor
must submit the judiciary's budget directly to the legislature without alteration,
governors take the opportunity to offer comments that can have a positive or
negative effect. One exception to this principle can be found in West Virginia.
Under that state's constitution, the legislature cannot decrease any budget item
related to the judiciary. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 51(5); see State ex rel. Bagley v.
Blankenship, 246 S.E.2d 99, 109 (W. Va. 1978).
227 The judiciary is the only branch of government that does not participate in
the formulation of a budget. In most states, the judiciary is treated as just another
agency of state government: like many executive branch agencies, it is required to
submit its budget directly to the governor. Thus, while the legislative and executive
branches of government have a seat at the budget table, the judiciary remains
outside the process, forced to compete with many other demands and treated in
most instances not as a branch of government but rather as a mere agency of
government. Thus, as noted in Anderson County Quarterly Court v. Judges of 28th
Judicial Circuit, 579 S.W.2d 875, 878-79 (1978),
"To offset their politically disadvantageous position and to
insure the orderly and efficient operation of their functions, the
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realize that state and federal funding decisions are clearly political and
most assuredly shift with the changing political landscape, the party in
power, and the public's constantly changing mind. Court
decisions-particularly unpopular decisions-can have political
ramifications far beyond the control of courts and can clearly affect the
budget allocated to the judiciary.228 The centralization of authority and
superintending power in state supreme courts has complicated the matter,
in that a single controversial decision can impact the entire judiciary's
state-funded budget, not just that of the court issuing the decision. At best,
state courts can be said to be the second among equals, and at most, on a
par with many executive departments when it comes to the budget.229 The
judiciary must be cognizant of this uncomfortable fact lest it risk
misreading the public support so critical in legitimizing acts of
government.23°
The use of inherent power to compel funding at the state level must,
therefore, rest on more than solely the judiciary's limited constitutional
courts, in recent years, have been more willing to utilize their
inherent powers.... But, however broad and justifiable the use
of inherent powers may be, it is not a license for unwarranted
flexing of the judicial power."
22 The 2000 attempt to remove New Hampshire Chief Justice David A. Brock
from office formed one arguable example of political fallout from court decisions.
Brock was charged under four articles of impeachment with misconduct in office
and ultimately acquitted by the Senate. Some observers maintained, however, that
the impeachment was actually political retribution for a 1997 decision finding the
state's school funding formula unconstitutional. See Ralph Ranalli, N.H. Senate
Acquits State's Chief Justice, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 11, 2000, at Al. For a fuller
discussion of the growing political ramifications of court decisions, see Charles
Mahtesian, Jurist Imprudence, GOVERNING.COM, Nov. 28, 2000, at
http://goveming.com/view/vu I 12800.htm. The judiciaries of the United States are
not alone in feeling pressure from the other branches of government. Judiciaries in
Canada and the United Kingdom are also under pressure, in part because of their
controversial decisions and in part because of "political" reform. See Tonda
MacCharles, Understand Judiciary Better, Expert Tells MPs, TORONTO STAR, Nov.
7, 2003, at A2; Joshua Rozenberg, Judges Warn of Labour's 'Nazi' Threat to
Justice, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 11, 2003, at 6.
229 See, e.g., supra note 17.
230 See John C. Taggart, Judicial Power-The Inherent Power of the Courts to
Compel Fundingfor Their Own Needs-In re Juvenile Director, 53 WASH. L. REV.
331, 336 (1978) ("Because the public is the final arbiter of disputes between the
branches, it is necessary that the public find acceptable the exercise of this inherent
power if it is to have any long term usefulness.").
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obligation to hear cases. This is not to suggest that the judiciary's
adjudicatory responsibilities are unimportant. Rather, it is to suggest that
in a one-on-one confrontation between coordinate branches of government,
considerations far beyond funding a new court, a few additional employees,
or a new computer system, come into play. The funding sought by the
judiciary should be that level reasonably necessary to ensure the existence
of the judiciary as both a government mechanism for resolving disputes
and, equally important, a separate branch of government exercising
different but coequal governing powers with the legislative and executive
branches. The latter basis is important because legislatures routinely alter
the landscape in which courts operate. Nonetheless, a legislature
cannot---either through substantive law or budgetary blackmail--eradicate
the judiciary's independence as a key ingredient in governing the nation.
The use of inherent power to compel a state legislature to fund courts
should be examined in light of both the judiciary's core constitutional role
and the need to resolve cases. At the state level, the use of inherent power
to compel funding would appear justified when a legislature's exercise of
its plenary authority over the budget interferes with the courts' ability to
exercise their adjudicatory function and undermines the judiciary's
constitutional status as an effective coequal institution of government. An
assertion ofjudicial authority that fails to articulate both principles not only
misses a critical constitutional mark, but also risks undermining public
support for the courts. The exercise of inherent power in the context of
defending the judiciary's constitutional status promotes the principle of
separation of powers and makes clear that in the United States, the
judiciary is an active participant in governing the nation, not merely an
umpire deciding private disputes.
IV. CONCLUSION
In an age of modern judicial institutions, courts do more than arbitrate
disputes. Through legislative action-and at times legislative
inaction-courts are evolving into protectors and purveyors of state and
national policy."' The function of the courts is expanding as the legislative
and executive branches, the traditional policy-making bodies, appear
increasingly paralyzed by the polemical debates and deep philosophical
231 See, e.g., State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), cert.
granted, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 836 (Jan. 26, 2004) (holding that the U.S. Supreme
Court would find execution of juveniles unconstitutional as abridging evolving
notions of decency).
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divides so prevalent today.232 Although courts clearly do not legislate in the
traditional sense as some might suggest, they have always and will continue
to participate in setting public policy through their decisions and the
programs created to support those decisions.233 Thus, it is difficult to
distinguish the "core" functions of the judiciary from the breadth of other
services it delivers to the public. Jefferson's description ofjudges as "mere
machines ' '234 is no more applicable today than it was 250 years ago. The
inevitable policymaking role of judges is a refreshing statement about the
constant evolution of American government, but also a ripe opportunity for
conflict with the other branches over the breadth and limits of judicial
authority.
Consequently, where the line lies between appropriate and
overreaching use of inherent power to compel certain actions may well be
defined less by law and history than by political reality and the evolving
role of courts in exercising their governing authority. The judiciary must,
therefore, be wise and restrained in the exercise of inherent powers.
Although courts have the inherent power to compel funding, the impact of
exercising that authority may have wide-ranging ramifications, affecting
not only the relationship between the judiciary and the other branches, but
also the judiciary's legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Clearly, the roles
and responsibilities of the courts have grown over the last fifty years, and
too often without the corresponding resources needed to meet new
challenges. The legislature must take note of this fact lest the points of
contention grow rather than recede. But courts must also recognize that
exercising inherent powers in a funding dispute carries with it political and
budgetary consequences.
It is beyond dispute that courts have the power to compel funding at a
state and local level. The question, therefore, is not whether courts can
exercise this power, but rather when they should do so. The nation's
232 The perceived sluggishness of the legislative process may contribute to the
use of the judiciary as a forum for resolving many public policy questions, partly
because the judicial process compels a "final" resolution within a relatively
reasonable timeframe.
... See, e.g., In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass.
2004) (holding that a bill proposing to prohibit same-sex couples from marrying,
but allowing them to form civil unions, violates the equal protection clause of the
state constitution); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.
2003) (finding same-sex marrages protected under Massachusetts state constitution
and giving state legislature six months to enact legislation effectuating the
decision).
234 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, supra note 63.
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jurisprudence in this area will most likely continue to evolve in a haphazard
fashion, perhaps reflecting everyone's lack of comfort with the notion. As
several courts have observed, it should be used only in the gravest of
circumstances.235 While in the end the judiciary possesses the ultimate legal
recourse, the courts must recognize that the political branches possess a
highly potent political response given their more direct connection to the
populace.236 Courts must be attentive to this stark reality in exercising
inherent powers lest they compromise not only their adjudicatory
independence, but also the public support so critical to maintaining the
institutional independence and vibrancy of the third branch of government.
235 See, e.g., Clark v. Dussault, 878 P.2d 239, 243 (Mont. 1994) (holding that
courts may use inherent power to compel funding only when established methods
have failed or an emergency arises).236 The legislature is not the only state government body possessing significant
political power which the courts must recognize. In a recent dispute in Illinois, the
state supreme court issued an order to the state comptroller to increase judicial
salaries per statute notwithstanding a gubernatorial veto of appropriations to fund
the increases. The comptroller refused to comply with the supreme court's order,
stating, "The Supreme Court is trying to direct an executive officer by administra-
tive order instead of through an open court process .... I dispute their ability to act
in such a unilateral fashion." Press Release, Daniel W. Hynes, Illinois Comptroller,
Hynes Disputes Supreme Court Order on Judicial Pay Raises (July 25, 2003).
Comptroller Hayes received significant support from the governor in defending
against the state supreme court's order. See Gov. Asks Judges to Drop Pay Raise
Lawsuit, N.w. IND. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2003. The court did not proceed with contempt
proceedings and subsequently vacated its order. The court did allow two suits by
individual judges to proceed, which resulted in an order to fund the pay increases.
That order was, however, stayed by the appeals court. See Appellate Panel Upholds
Freeze on Judges' Pay, BEACON NEWS, Dec. 17, 2003. Notwithstanding the
outcome of those lawsuits, the case does demonstrate the political difficulty courts
face in ordering state officials to spend unappropriated resources on behalf of the
judiciary, particularly when that expenditure is viewed as being motivated purely
by self-interest. The lack of popular support for such action not only undercuts the
court's ability to effectuate specific spending orders, but also compromises the
credibility of the courts.
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